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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
barrage would then be engaged and overrun by 37. During initial and subsequent operations, Pact
assaulting infantry and tanks. commanders would implement their doctrine for ra-
34. Work to reduce the vulnerability of tanks to dioelectronic combat to locate and either jam or
antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) has been under way destroy NATO communication and radar links. (See
in the Soviet Union since at least the early 1960s, most section F, beginning at paragraph 197, in chapter II.)
of it directed at defeating the high-explosive antitank Ground force jamming units, located on the flanks
(HEAT) warheads which virtually all infantry anti- during the breakthrough operation and with the ad-
tank weapons in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact vance echelons during the subsequent exploitation
employ. To provide better protection, particularly phase, would attempt to jam NATO's command and
against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links.
rated composite or laminated armor arrays in their These links would also be targeted for destruction by
new T-64 and T-72 tanks. The additional tanks which Pact artillery and tactical aircraft.
the Soviets have assigned to their divisions in the past 38. Replacement Concepts. The Pact structures
decade (see paragraph 12 in chapter II) may be and employs its ground forces in ways significantly
intended to compensate for the heavier losses that different from the US approach. In large measure,
Soviet planners expect to sustain from improved anti- these differences account for the different means
tank defenses and to enable assaulting units to over- adopted by the Pact and the United States for replac-
whelm these defenses by sheer numbers. The addition ing personnel and equipment expended in combat.
of an independent tank battalion to a motorized rifle Generally speaking, the Pact designs its combat units
division provides the division commander with an with leaner man-to-equipment ratios and with more
additional maneuver force to commit at a critical modest levels of service support. Pact combat-ready
point in the battle. divisions have roughly the same number of tanks and
35. Subsequent Operations. If a major break- artillery as comparable US divisions, but only about
through were accomplished by the forces of the half as many men. For example, a Soviet tank division
Soviet-East German front, the three tank armies of at combat strength has about 9,500 men, 322 medium
this front probably would launch rapid thrusts- tanks, 60 howitzers, and 18 multiple-round rocket
perhaps aided by airborne assaults-in an attempt to launchers; a US armored division at full strength has
secure crossings over the Rhine near Essen, Frankfurt, around 17,000 men, 324 medium tanks, and 66
and similar points, and continue the advance to at least howitzers.
the French border. The Polish front, upon breaking 39. In Pact doctrine, divisions and, to some extent
through initial defenses in its area, would be responsi- armies would be committed to intensive first-echelon
ble for advancing both into Denmark and across combat missions for relatively short periods of time,
northern Germany into the Netherlands. The Soviet- after which they would be rotated into second echelon
Czechoslovak front would move into southern West or reserve. Respites from combat would be used to
Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the units' effectiveness by replacing personnel
Rhine south of Mannheim. losses and repairing or replacing unserviceable or
36. The roles of the reinforcing fronts from the missing equipment.. This contrasts with US practice of
western USSR would depend on the progress of the designing combat units with the idea of sustaining
initial offensive them in combat for long periods and keeping them
major elements-two or three armies-from one or more or less continuously replenished with personnel
two Soviet fronts from the western USSR transiting and equipment.
Central Europe in time to enter combat by the end of 40. Thus, Pact and US replacement concepts are
the first week of fighting. The origins of the initial consistent with their respective force structures and
reinforcements and their exact areas of responsibility employment practices and confer no particular advan-
when committed to battle are variously depicted tage. The Soviets stress unit rather than individual
forces in the Belorussian and Car- replacements for combat units under engagement in
pathian Military Districts are used most frequently. both conventional and nuclear war and probably
When the front from the Baltic Military District is would confine individual replacements mainly to com-
committed, it usually enters the battle between the bat units in second echelon or reserve. The United
Soviet-East German and Polish fronts States plans for unit replacement in nuclear war but
would generally stress individual replacements in con-
ventional war.
IV--10

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.