Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

barrage would then be engaged and overrun by 37. During initial and subsequent operations, Pact
assaulting infantry and tanks. commanders would implement their doctrine for ra-
34. Work to reduce the vulnerability of tanks to dioelectronic combat to locate and either jam or
antitank guided missiles (ATGMs) has been under way destroy NATO communication and radar links. (See
in the Soviet Union since at least the early 1960s, most section F, beginning at paragraph 197, in chapter II.)
of it directed at defeating the high-explosive antitank Ground force jamming units, located on the flanks
(HEAT) warheads which virtually all infantry anti- during the breakthrough operation and with the ad-
tank weapons in both NATO and the Warsaw Pact vance echelons during the subsequent exploitation
employ. To provide better protection, particularly phase, would attempt to jam NATO's command and
against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links.
rated composite or laminated armor arrays in their These links would also be targeted for destruction by
new T-64 and T-72 tanks. The additional tanks which Pact artillery and tactical aircraft.
the Soviets have assigned to their divisions in the past 38. Replacement Concepts. The Pact structures
decade (see paragraph 12 in chapter II) may be and employs its ground forces in ways significantly
intended to compensate for the heavier losses that different from the US approach. In large measure,
Soviet planners expect to sustain from improved anti- these differences account for the different means
tank defenses and to enable assaulting units to over- adopted by the Pact and the United States for replac-
whelm these defenses by sheer numbers. The addition ing personnel and equipment expended in combat.
of an independent tank battalion to a motorized rifle Generally speaking, the Pact designs its combat units
division provides the division commander with an with leaner man-to-equipment ratios and with more
additional maneuver force to commit at a critical modest levels of service support. Pact combat-ready
point in the battle. divisions have roughly the same number of tanks and
35. Subsequent Operations. If a major break- artillery as comparable US divisions, but only about
through were accomplished by the forces of the half as many men. For example, a Soviet tank division
Soviet-East German front, the three tank armies of at combat strength has about 9,500 men, 322 medium
this front probably would launch rapid thrusts- tanks, 60 howitzers, and 18 multiple-round rocket
perhaps aided by airborne assaults-in an attempt to launchers; a US armored division at full strength has
secure crossings over the Rhine near Essen, Frankfurt, around 17,000 men, 324 medium tanks, and 66
and similar points, and continue the advance to at least howitzers.
the French border. The Polish front, upon breaking 39. In Pact doctrine, divisions and, to some extent
through initial defenses in its area, would be responsi- armies would be committed to intensive first-echelon
ble for advancing both into Denmark and across combat missions for relatively short periods of time,
northern Germany into the Netherlands. The Soviet- after which they would be rotated into second echelon
Czechoslovak front would move into southern West or reserve. Respites from combat would be used to
Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the units' effectiveness by replacing personnel
Rhine south of Mannheim. losses and repairing or replacing unserviceable or
36. The roles of the reinforcing fronts from the missing equipment.. This contrasts with US practice of
western USSR would depend on the progress of the designing combat units with the idea of sustaining
initial offensive them in combat for long periods and keeping them
major elements-two or three armies-from one or more or less continuously replenished with personnel
two Soviet fronts from the western USSR transiting and equipment.
Central Europe in time to enter combat by the end of 40. Thus, Pact and US replacement concepts are
the first week of fighting. The origins of the initial consistent with their respective force structures and
reinforcements and their exact areas of responsibility employment practices and confer no particular advan-
when committed to battle are variously depicted tage. The Soviets stress unit rather than individual
forces in the Belorussian and Car- replacements for combat units under engagement in
pathian Military Districts are used most frequently. both conventional and nuclear war and probably
When the front from the Baltic Military District is would confine individual replacements mainly to com-
committed, it usually enters the battle between the bat units in second echelon or reserve. The United
Soviet-East German and Polish fronts States plans for unit replacement in nuclear war but
would generally stress individual replacements in con-
ventional war.
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