Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
motorized rifle divisions-as conducting the initial NATO lines so that NATO cannot effectively employ assault and breaking through the defenses with multi- nuclear weapons without endangering its own troops. pie penetrations on a broad frontage. According to the The Soviets recognize, however, that the breakthrough doctrinal writings, this type of assault configuration operation is a complex and risky maneuver. would be optimally suited for attacking hastily con- structed, weak defenses or for keeping pressure on retreating NATO forces, not for breaking through a well-prepared defense. 27. 30. The Soviets place considerable stress on efforts In the Pact exercises, NATO is the aggressor, to anticipate NATO's intention to use nuclear weapons either launching an attack or preparing to do so. In the on a large scale and to anticipate it in time to launch a first case, Pact forces counterattack and are pursuing a Pact preemptive attack. To this end, they expect to retreating NATO force when they cross the border. In keep their own nuclear delivery systems in a high state the second case, the Pact crosses the border to preempt of readiness and to conduct a vigorous reconnaissance the impending NATO attack. In neither case does the and intelligence-collecting campaign against NATO's Pact encounter a well-prepared NATO defense. None- nuclear units and facilities, as well as its communica- theless, Pact planners probably are aware that actual tions networks, to detect signs which might presage the NATO strategy envisages the Pact as the aggressor imminent use of nuclear weapons. with NATO forces in prepared forward defenses 31. Tanks Versus Antitank Weapons. Because the awaiting the Pact assault. type of offensive the Pact planners envision in Central 28. The Dilemma of the Nuclear Transition. Europe is highly dependent on the mobility and shock Soviet military writings confirm that Warsaw Pact effect provided by large numbers of tanks, the Pact is planners see a dilemma in the prospect that a war with concerned that the proliferation in NATO forces of NATO could be nonnuclear in the beginning and improved antitank weapons has greatly increased escalate rapidly to large-scale nuclear war. On the one NATO's capability to stop Pact armor. As a result, the hand, if faced with strong, continuous NA'TO defenses, Pact has modified its tactics and initiated several force the Pact planners would have to mass large concentra- improvement programs in an effort to cope with tions of forces in places of their choosing to attempt NATO's antitank threat. breakthroughs. On the other hand, they fear that 32. Pact doctrine has traditionally stressed the role NATO might take advantage of their vulnerability of artillery on the conventional battlefield, and the while massing for an attack and launch a nuclear Pact now has in Central Europe more than twice as strike. The dilemma has led the Soviets to plan a large- many artillery pieces as NATO. Pact artillery doctrine scale nonnuclear air attack on NATO's air and nuclear stresses preplanned, massed barrages, which provides facilities-to -which they would commit the bulk of the high volume of fire required in nonnuclear break- the Warsaw Pact tactical air force and much of the through operations against relatively static defenses, Soviet LRA bomber force-in an attempt to eliminate especially against forward antitank defenses. The large most of NATO's theater nuclear potential at the very number of multiple rocket launchers deployed with outset of hostilities. Pact forces could be particularly effective in this role. 29. The Pact's plans to reduce the vulnerability of 33. In accordance with Pact doctrine, defensive its attacking ground forces during a breakthrough . positions on these axes would be subjected before a effort call for dispersed units to converge rapidly near major assault to a 40-to-50-minute bombardment by the point of contact with NATO forces, attack, achieve artillery and possibly by tactical air forces. During the a breakthrough, and then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along a number of different terrain to minimize exposure to NATO's weapons, axes. This tactic is designed to minimize the time would try to position themselves for a rapid assault during which Pact forces would be exposed to nuclear against NATO's defenses. Smoke from shells and strikes. It is also intended to complicate NATO's use of smoke generated by devices on the tanks would also be nuclear weapons by having the Pact units come used to mask the assault. Antitank strongpoints which together for the assault at a point as close as possible to were not destroyed or suppressed by the preparatory IV-9
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.