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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
motorized rifle divisions-as conducting the initial NATO lines so that NATO cannot effectively employ
assault and breaking through the defenses with multi- nuclear weapons without endangering its own troops.
pie penetrations on a broad frontage. According to the The Soviets recognize, however, that the breakthrough
doctrinal writings, this type of assault configuration operation is a complex and risky maneuver.
would be optimally suited for attacking hastily con-
structed, weak defenses or for keeping pressure on
retreating NATO forces, not for breaking through a
well-prepared defense.
27.
30. The Soviets place considerable stress on efforts
In the Pact exercises, NATO is the aggressor, to anticipate NATO's intention to use nuclear weapons
either launching an attack or preparing to do so. In the on a large scale and to anticipate it in time to launch a
first case, Pact forces counterattack and are pursuing a Pact preemptive attack. To this end, they expect to
retreating NATO force when they cross the border. In keep their own nuclear delivery systems in a high state
the second case, the Pact crosses the border to preempt of readiness and to conduct a vigorous reconnaissance
the impending NATO attack. In neither case does the and intelligence-collecting campaign against NATO's
Pact encounter a well-prepared NATO defense. None- nuclear units and facilities, as well as its communica-
theless, Pact planners probably are aware that actual tions networks, to detect signs which might presage the
NATO strategy envisages the Pact as the aggressor imminent use of nuclear weapons.
with NATO forces in prepared forward defenses 31. Tanks Versus Antitank Weapons. Because the
awaiting the Pact assault. type of offensive the Pact planners envision in Central
28. The Dilemma of the Nuclear Transition. Europe is highly dependent on the mobility and shock
Soviet military writings confirm that Warsaw Pact effect provided by large numbers of tanks, the Pact is
planners see a dilemma in the prospect that a war with concerned that the proliferation in NATO forces of
NATO could be nonnuclear in the beginning and improved antitank weapons has greatly increased
escalate rapidly to large-scale nuclear war. On the one NATO's capability to stop Pact armor. As a result, the
hand, if faced with strong, continuous NA'TO defenses, Pact has modified its tactics and initiated several force
the Pact planners would have to mass large concentra- improvement programs in an effort to cope with
tions of forces in places of their choosing to attempt NATO's antitank threat.
breakthroughs. On the other hand, they fear that 32. Pact doctrine has traditionally stressed the role
NATO might take advantage of their vulnerability of artillery on the conventional battlefield, and the
while massing for an attack and launch a nuclear Pact now has in Central Europe more than twice as
strike. The dilemma has led the Soviets to plan a large- many artillery pieces as NATO. Pact artillery doctrine
scale nonnuclear air attack on NATO's air and nuclear stresses preplanned, massed barrages, which provides
facilities-to -which they would commit the bulk of the high volume of fire required in nonnuclear break-
the Warsaw Pact tactical air force and much of the through operations against relatively static defenses,
Soviet LRA bomber force-in an attempt to eliminate especially against forward antitank defenses. The large
most of NATO's theater nuclear potential at the very number of multiple rocket launchers deployed with
outset of hostilities. Pact forces could be particularly effective in this role.
29. The Pact's plans to reduce the vulnerability of 33. In accordance with Pact doctrine, defensive
its attacking ground forces during a breakthrough . positions on these axes would be subjected before a
effort call for dispersed units to converge rapidly near major assault to a 40-to-50-minute bombardment by
the point of contact with NATO forces, attack, achieve artillery and possibly by tactical air forces. During the
a breakthrough, and then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using
advance or exploitation along a number of different terrain to minimize exposure to NATO's weapons,
axes. This tactic is designed to minimize the time would try to position themselves for a rapid assault
during which Pact forces would be exposed to nuclear against NATO's defenses. Smoke from shells and
strikes. It is also intended to complicate NATO's use of smoke generated by devices on the tanks would also be
nuclear weapons by having the Pact units come used to mask the assault. Antitank strongpoints which
together for the assault at a point as close as possible to were not destroyed or suppressed by the preparatory
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.