Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
- The Pact would begin to organize at least five fronts for use in Central Europe from the time of the decision to go to full readiness. - There is virtually no chance that the Soviets would attack from a standing start. - The smallest force the Pact would use to begin a theater offensive would consist of two fronts, 24. Concepts for the Offensive. The tactics em- requiring about four days of preparation; except ployed by the Pact to overcome NATO defenses will in an extraordinarily time-urgent circumstance, be based on its perceptions of how strong those it is extremely unlikely the Pact would initiate defenses are. The Pact would prefer to employ forces war from this posture on multiple axes, moving in tactical march columns to - The Pact would prefer, before attacking, to penetrate defense positions through gaps; weak points, prepare at least a three-front force, which would and open flanks, relying heavily on speed and maneu- require, at a minimum, about eight days of. ver. In areas where the Pact believed that it must preparation. penetrate strong, continuous NATO defenses it would mount breakthrough operations on each principal axis - Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up even greater forces in Eastern Europe before of advance to the overall theater offensive plan and initiating hostilities against NATO. the strength of the defense, a breakthrough attempt 23. Soviet Views of NATO Defenses. Soviet plan- might involve the major forces of either a front or an ners would anticipate a quick, strong NATO reaction army. to any attack. 25. According to Soviet doctrinical writings, in a the Soviets have good conventional assault against well-prepared defense, the data on NATO's order of battle, alert procedures, commander of a Soviet wartime front with three to readiness categories, and mobilization times and| five subordinate armies probably would hold his tank they interpret this information in a prudent, conserva- armies in reserve and commit the combined arms for tive manner. the initial breakthrough of NATO's defensive posi- tions. The tank armies would then be commited to exploit penetrations or weakened sectors of the de- fense. A modern combined-arms army with three to five motorized rifle and tank divisions would usually have an offensive operational zone 70 kilometers or so wide. An individual army commander in a break- through. attempt would mass the bulk of his forces along a front of less than 10 kilometers, leaving enough forces in other sectors to hold againat a NATO counterattack or to initiate diversionary thrusts. Launch almost 10 percent of tactical nuclear 26. missiles within five minutes. - Emplace some nuclear mine barriers within two Pact doctrine for overcoming strong, fixed and a half hours and the remainder within 11 d eenses, calls hours for combine -arms armies to concentrate their attacks - Complete the air deployment to Europe from the on narrow frontages to overcome the defenses and United States of two divisions in three days. create gaps for the tank armies to exploit. IV-8 TopooSee81
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.