Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
- The Pact would begin to organize at least five
fronts for use in Central Europe from the time of
the decision to go to full readiness.
- There is virtually no chance that the Soviets
would attack from a standing start.
- The smallest force the Pact would use to begin a
theater offensive would consist of two fronts, 24. Concepts for the Offensive. The tactics em-
requiring about four days of preparation; except ployed by the Pact to overcome NATO defenses will
in an extraordinarily time-urgent circumstance, be based on its perceptions of how strong those
it is extremely unlikely the Pact would initiate defenses are. The Pact would prefer to employ forces
war from this posture on multiple axes, moving in tactical march columns to
- The Pact would prefer, before attacking, to penetrate defense positions through gaps; weak points,
prepare at least a three-front force, which would and open flanks, relying heavily on speed and maneu-
require, at a minimum, about eight days of. ver. In areas where the Pact believed that it must
preparation. penetrate strong, continuous NATO defenses it would
mount breakthrough operations on each principal axis
- Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis
up even greater forces in Eastern Europe before of advance to the overall theater offensive plan and
initiating hostilities against NATO. the strength of the defense, a breakthrough attempt
23. Soviet Views of NATO Defenses. Soviet plan- might involve the major forces of either a front or an
ners would anticipate a quick, strong NATO reaction army.
to any attack. 25. According to Soviet doctrinical writings, in a
the Soviets have good conventional assault against well-prepared defense, the
data on NATO's order of battle, alert procedures, commander of a Soviet wartime front with three to
readiness categories, and mobilization times and| five subordinate armies probably would hold his tank
they interpret this information in a prudent, conserva- armies in reserve and commit the combined arms for
tive manner. the initial breakthrough of NATO's defensive posi-
tions. The tank armies would then be commited to
exploit penetrations or weakened sectors of the de-
fense. A modern combined-arms army with three to
five motorized rifle and tank divisions would usually
have an offensive operational zone 70 kilometers or so
wide. An individual army commander in a break-
through. attempt would mass the bulk of his forces
along a front of less than 10 kilometers, leaving enough
forces in other sectors to hold againat a NATO
counterattack or to initiate diversionary thrusts.
Launch almost 10 percent of tactical nuclear 26.
missiles within five minutes.
- Emplace some nuclear mine barriers within two Pact doctrine for overcoming strong, fixed
and a half hours and the remainder within 11 d eenses, calls
hours for combine -arms armies to concentrate their attacks
- Complete the air deployment to Europe from the on narrow frontages to overcome the defenses and
United States of two divisions in three days. create gaps for the tank armies to exploit.
IV-8
TopooSee81

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.