Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 114 …recently halted Soviet air operations from Conakry. These developments will obviously force the 257. Many officers…
  • p. 115 …order to keep other in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational. of communication…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets could elect to provide combat forces scale commitment of manpower and materiel which to…
  • p. 187 …This force is occasionally aug- forces could not be safely transported by sea or air to…
  • p. 188 …a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few recently introduced Flogger…
- The Pact would begin to organize at least five
fronts for use in Central Europe from the time of
the decision to go to full readiness.
- There is virtually no chance that the Soviets
would attack from a standing start.
- The smallest force the Pact would use to begin a
theater offensive would consist of two fronts, 24. Concepts for the Offensive. The tactics em-
requiring about four days of preparation; except ployed by the Pact to overcome NATO defenses will
in an extraordinarily time-urgent circumstance, be based on its perceptions of how strong those
it is extremely unlikely the Pact would initiate defenses are. The Pact would prefer to employ forces
war from this posture on multiple axes, moving in tactical march columns to
- The Pact would prefer, before attacking, to penetrate defense positions through gaps; weak points,
prepare at least a three-front force, which would and open flanks, relying heavily on speed and maneu-
require, at a minimum, about eight days of. ver. In areas where the Pact believed that it must
preparation. penetrate strong, continuous NATO defenses it would
mount breakthrough operations on each principal axis
- Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis
up even greater forces in Eastern Europe before of advance to the overall theater offensive plan and
initiating hostilities against NATO. the strength of the defense, a breakthrough attempt
23. Soviet Views of NATO Defenses. Soviet plan- might involve the major forces of either a front or an
ners would anticipate a quick, strong NATO reaction army.
to any attack. 25. According to Soviet doctrinical writings, in a
the Soviets have good conventional assault against well-prepared defense, the
data on NATO's order of battle, alert procedures, commander of a Soviet wartime front with three to
readiness categories, and mobilization times and| five subordinate armies probably would hold his tank
they interpret this information in a prudent, conserva- armies in reserve and commit the combined arms for
tive manner. the initial breakthrough of NATO's defensive posi-
tions. The tank armies would then be commited to
exploit penetrations or weakened sectors of the de-
fense. A modern combined-arms army with three to
five motorized rifle and tank divisions would usually
have an offensive operational zone 70 kilometers or so
wide. An individual army commander in a break-
through. attempt would mass the bulk of his forces
along a front of less than 10 kilometers, leaving enough
forces in other sectors to hold againat a NATO
counterattack or to initiate diversionary thrusts.
Launch almost 10 percent of tactical nuclear 26.
missiles within five minutes.
- Emplace some nuclear mine barriers within two Pact doctrine for overcoming strong, fixed
and a half hours and the remainder within 11 d eenses, calls
hours for combine -arms armies to concentrate their attacks
- Complete the air deployment to Europe from the on narrow frontages to overcome the defenses and
United States of two divisions in three days. create gaps for the tank armies to exploit.
IV-8
TopooSee81

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.