Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
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capabilities to undertake or sustain combat operations, by threatening to upset the political advantage afforded Preparations which, in a less demanding operation, them by superiority in forces-in-being in Central would be undertaken in a phased or sequential pattern Europe. In such a contingency, and if they perceived would have to occur simultaneously. truly vital interests at risk, the Soviets might set in 15. By waiting to establish a two-front attack force, motion the option for rapid buildup and early attack. the Pact would diminish many of the critical deficien- Their efforts would be intended to preempt NATO cies of the standing-start attack. Naval capabilities defensive and diplomatic preparations, not an imme- would be substantially improved, and the minimal essentials of the command and control system could be 19. Option III-Attack With Three Fronts. The functioning. third and fourth options are ones in which Soviet 16; Still, initiating hostilities after only these mini- planners, under a less urgent need to defend or attack, would elect to bring the Pact to full readiness via a mum preparations were made would entail serious.. more efficient, phased buildup procedure and to risks for the Pact and would be extremely unlikely mor.ef .ent,phase bildup proceduran to attack when the force available for initial operations except in the most urgent circumstances. The attack- totaled three fronts (Option III) or five fronts (Option ing force itself would lack some front-level elements and oul haet coer he boadsecor romthe IV). The same evidence cited earlier on Pact buildup planning and procedures indicates that, in these cir- Baltic to Austria. Command and control capabilities, particularly at the theater level, would remain incom- plete. Pact mobilization would not have proceeded far about eight days to achieve a three-front force. enough to ensure immediate followup forces and 20. The Pact preference for a larger-than-two-front supplies for the attack in Central Europe and effective attack is well supported in Soviet writings and by participation in the war by major forces in other areas. analysis of Pact exercises. The phased buildup to three fronts-a total of some 50 to 60 divisions plus support 17. We are agreed that it is extremely unlikely that and tactical air units-would offer a reasonable expec- the Pact would initiate war from this two-front pos- tation of an orderly and efficient transition to an ture in other than extraordinarily time-urgent circum- attack posture affording force superiority, sustainabil- stances. On this point there are two views. One holds ity, and precautions against the risks of a wider war. that the only circumstances which would cause the addition, this option would provide opportunity for Pact to initiate theaterwide offensive operations significantly more naval forces to deploy. Accordingly, against NATO from this posture with only four days of we judge that, except in extraordinarily urgent cir- preparation would be the Soviet perception of the cumstances (as described above in paragraphs 17 and threat of imminent NATO attack. Although NATO 18), the Pact would prefer to prepare at least a three- mobilization would be viewed as a serious threat and front force before initiating hostilities. would almost certainly cause the Pact to make counter- preparations, the Soviets would be particularly averse 21. Option IV-Attack With Five Fronts. The to initiating an attack with a force not fully prepared Pact might elect to build up even greater forces in against NATO forces which enjoyed some advantages Eastern Europe prior to initiating hostilities against of prior preparation or mobilization-unless threat of NATO, depending on its assessment of the political imminent NATO attack was clear.' and military situation at the time. A five-front posture- 18. The other view holds that the Soviets might about 90 ground divisions plus support and tactical air units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front force in a variety fulfill Soviet conservative doctrinal preferences to the of urgent contingencies. For example, during a serious East-West political dispute, the NATO countries (par- about tossible m aciver tictularly the United States and West Germany) might undertake a degree of mobilization and other military 22. In summary, the following judgments are preparations to improve their defensive postures and unanimous within the Intelligence Community 0 to demonstrate will in support of the diplomatic bargaining. The Soviets, of course, might see this as weakening their own bargaining position, in particular The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency 2 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart- Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Senior ment of state. Intelligence Officers of each of the military services. IV-7 Tero
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.