Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

capabilities to undertake or sustain combat operations, by threatening to upset the political advantage afforded
Preparations which, in a less demanding operation, them by superiority in forces-in-being in Central
would be undertaken in a phased or sequential pattern Europe. In such a contingency, and if they perceived
would have to occur simultaneously. truly vital interests at risk, the Soviets might set in
15. By waiting to establish a two-front attack force, motion the option for rapid buildup and early attack.
the Pact would diminish many of the critical deficien- Their efforts would be intended to preempt NATO
cies of the standing-start attack. Naval capabilities defensive and diplomatic preparations, not an imme-
would be substantially improved, and the minimal
essentials of the command and control system could be 19. Option III-Attack With Three Fronts. The
functioning. third and fourth options are ones in which Soviet
16; Still, initiating hostilities after only these mini- planners, under a less urgent need to defend or attack,
would elect to bring the Pact to full readiness via a
mum preparations were made would entail serious.. more efficient, phased buildup procedure and to
risks for the Pact and would be extremely unlikely mor.ef .ent,phase bildup proceduran to
attack when the force available for initial operations
except in the most urgent circumstances. The attack- totaled three fronts (Option III) or five fronts (Option
ing force itself would lack some front-level elements
and oul haet coer he boadsecor romthe IV). The same evidence cited earlier on Pact buildup
planning and procedures indicates that, in these cir-
Baltic to Austria. Command and control capabilities,
particularly at the theater level, would remain incom-
plete. Pact mobilization would not have proceeded far about eight days to achieve a three-front force.
enough to ensure immediate followup forces and 20. The Pact preference for a larger-than-two-front
supplies for the attack in Central Europe and effective attack is well supported in Soviet writings and by
participation in the war by major forces in other areas. analysis of Pact exercises. The phased buildup to three
fronts-a total of some 50 to 60 divisions plus support
17. We are agreed that it is extremely unlikely that and tactical air units-would offer a reasonable expec-
the Pact would initiate war from this two-front pos- tation of an orderly and efficient transition to an
ture in other than extraordinarily time-urgent circum- attack posture affording force superiority, sustainabil-
stances. On this point there are two views. One holds ity, and precautions against the risks of a wider war.
that the only circumstances which would cause the addition, this option would provide opportunity for
Pact to initiate theaterwide offensive operations significantly more naval forces to deploy. Accordingly,
against NATO from this posture with only four days of we judge that, except in extraordinarily urgent cir-
preparation would be the Soviet perception of the cumstances (as described above in paragraphs 17 and
threat of imminent NATO attack. Although NATO 18), the Pact would prefer to prepare at least a three-
mobilization would be viewed as a serious threat and front force before initiating hostilities.
would almost certainly cause the Pact to make counter-
preparations, the Soviets would be particularly averse 21. Option IV-Attack With Five Fronts. The
to initiating an attack with a force not fully prepared Pact might elect to build up even greater forces in
against NATO forces which enjoyed some advantages Eastern Europe prior to initiating hostilities against
of prior preparation or mobilization-unless threat of NATO, depending on its assessment of the political
imminent NATO attack was clear.' and military situation at the time. A five-front posture-
18. The other view holds that the Soviets might about 90 ground divisions plus support and tactical air
units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front force in a variety fulfill Soviet conservative doctrinal preferences to the
of urgent contingencies. For example, during a serious
East-West political dispute, the NATO countries (par- about tossible m aciver
tictularly the United States and West Germany) might
undertake a degree of mobilization and other military 22. In summary, the following judgments are
preparations to improve their defensive postures and unanimous within the Intelligence Community 0
to demonstrate will in support of the diplomatic
bargaining. The Soviets, of course, might see this as
weakening their own bargaining position, in particular
The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency 2 The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelligence
and the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Depart- Agency; the Director, National Security Agency; and the Senior
ment of state. Intelligence Officers of each of the military services.
IV-7
Tero