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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 20 …Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater headquarters in being in peacetime, although hardened…
  • p. 21 …control of the Western and Southwestern TVD headquarters-often called High Commands by the Soviets. The…
  • p. 26 …links could be established to theater-level headquarters and to supporting strategic cornmands. Communications, between Moscow…
  • p. 35 …Surprise in the known: ' Soviet view can be achieved through many means- Administrative Structure HeadQuartered in…
  • p. 55 …The Soviets Headquarters in Moscow and are considered strategic maintain a total of 15 such divisions…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 74 …Readiness from Naval Headquarters in Moscow, from fleet Home Waters 40 Operable headquarters,.or by command…
  • p. 114 …reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide…
  • p. 117 …Some do not have Ground Forces headquarters; some have d. Not all have naval commands. Military…
  • p. 118 …in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD, headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime…
  • p. 119 …The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of…
  • p. 122 …Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact…
  • p. 182 …The number of older ballistic missile subma- links could be established to theater-level headquarters rincs…
  • p. 183 …communications system for use between major fixed headquarters. 108. Logistic Support. Improvements in the logis- tic…
Top Secret RUFF UMBRA
Option II: Three Fronts Figure IV-2
Pol.
Warsaw Pact Options r 5so
for Initial Attack Force in the Central Region ~ EAST
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Option IV: Five Fronts
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The smallest force the Pact might use to starttheater offensive operationsprobablywouldcon- -r - pFroM
sisr of two fronts-a total of some40 ground divisions plus support and tacticalair units. In the -n
mneturgentcircumstances, the Pactwould need about four daysto preparethisforce Attackwith . ' Belorussian
slightly less than fourdays is possible, but the complexity of the operation and the risks attending NETH EAST ( Front
insuficimet preparationwouldlikolycausethe Sovietsto takemorethan iour daysto prepare -Berlin
this horce. 'GERMANY - Warsaw
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WEST Soviet Front
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Estalishmenr of a five-frontposture-someBOto 90 ground dvisions-before initiating an often- ) A
siue againstNATOwould fultill Sovietconservativedoctrinalpreferencesto the eaten possiblein SWITZERLAND te u. f HUNGARY
pracicalterms ard would take abouttwo weeksto achieve OMANIA
SECRET IV-5
TCS 2267-79111 Top Secret

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.