Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Top er
task of destroying NATO forces in West Ger- war from a standing start are persuasive, and we judge
many roughly between Hannover in the north that there is virtually no chance the Soviets would
and Mannheim in the south. It could engage initiate a war against NATO with an attack from a
forces from as many as six of NATO's eight corps standing start. The Soviets would have to expect that
areas. the standing-start attack would cause NATO to initiate
massive and rapid mobilization, almost simultaneously
- Northern. Pact forces here would be responsible with the Pact, and the local force superiority which
for engaging NATO forces in the areas of the two would accrue in such an attack probably could not be
northernmost corps of the NATO Central Re- maintained if NATO forces reacted effectively. The
gion, as well as in Denmark. Pact writings and Soviets, considering their conservative view of NATO
exercises indicate that the Polish front, including rapid mobilization capabilities, might well conclude
some 15 divisions, would be primarily responsi- that the attacking force could face an adverse situation
ble for this area, but Soviet and East German before reinforcements could be committed. The attack
forces would be expected to assume defensive would initially have to rely on incomplete lines of
responsibility for the area temporarily until Pol- communication. The Soviets would not have time to
ish forces arrived, establish a front-level command, control, and commu-
- Southwestern. The majority of the forces in the nications structure or to prepare the Soviet or East
front assuming responsibility for this area would European populace or national economies for war-
be Czechoslovak, but they would include the five fare-both basic requirements posed in Soviet military
Soviet divisions in the Group of Forces in literature. Finally, the standing-start attack would
Czechoslovakia. This front, with some 15 divi- leave other Pact strategic and general purpose forces-
sions in all, would have the responsibility of as well as the national economy-unprepared for
attacking toward the Rhine in an area roughly expanded hostilities. In particular the Soviets would be
between Mannheim and the Swiss border. concerned about the threat of NATO escalation to
nuclear war.
10. In NIE 4-1-78 (Warsaw Pact Capabilities for
Going to War in Europe: Implications for NATO 13. Option II-Attack With Two Fronts. Exten-
Warning of War), we evalated various attack options sive analysis of Pact exercises and doctrine leads us to
which the Warsaw Pact might consider for launching conclude that the smallest force the Pact would use to
offensives in Central Europe, should it decide to start a start theater offensive operations would consist of two
war with NATO. These options defined alternative fronts. (See figure IV-2.) This force would be com-
ways in which the Pact might organize the 87-division posed essentially of all Soviet ground and tactical air
force described above. In paragraphs 11-22 which force units in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslo-
follow, we summarize the conclusions of that vakia together with most of the East German and
evaluation. Czechoslovak units which are active in peacetime-a
total of some 40 ground divisions, plus support and
11. Option I-The Standing-Start Attack. There tactical air units.
is no evidence of Soviet or Pact military literature,
doctrine, plans, or exercises which feature an unpre- 14. Extensive study of
pared, standing-start attack on NATO from a peace- the Pact's theoretical capability
time force posture. The Soviets, however, do have the to organize, deploy, and prepare forces for war in
capability to attack NATO units using ground and air Europe, indicates that, in the most urgent circum-
combat forces garrisoned near the inter-German bor- stances, the Pact would need about four days to
der. As many as 10 to 15 Soviet divisions and perhaps prepare a two-front force. While initiation of an attack
several East German divisions could reach initial with slightly less than four full (lays of preparation is
combat points and lead or support such an attack in possible, the complexity and magnitude of the opera-
the Central Region in somewhat less than 24 hours. 13y tion and the risks attending insufficient preparation
dint of surprise and local force superiority, Soviet would be likely to cause the Soviets to take more than
planners would expect-and might achieve-some four days to prepare this two-front force. These
early ground and air victories. preparations would be made using a compressed buildup
procedure that would exacerbate the confusion and
12. These initial successes would likely be the only disruptions inherent in a transition to a war footing
advantage that would accrue to such an attack, how- and, at least initially, would yield combat units-and
ever. The considerations that weigh against initiating a especially combat support units-with less than full
IV-4
T3-~ecet-