Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
Top 5ecrl A. The Initial Campaign in the Western Theater mize initial combat power, on the assumption that a of Military Operations war in Europe would be short and, therefore, decided largely by forces in being or quickly available. (See The Ground Offensive table IV-1.) Accordingly, the Soviets plan against the contingency that Pact forces based in Central Europe, 7. Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and about half of them East European, might be required rapid ground offensive into NATO territory in Central to initiate a Pact offensive campaign and, bypassing Europe to defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, strong resistance, carry the campaign well into NATO and seize or destroy ports and airfields to prevent territory before reinforcements would arrive from the reinforcement. Because this strategy envisions a highly western USSiR fluid battlefield and high rates of advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western Theater of Miili- forward defenses rapidly to prevent the Western tary Operations evidently envisions offensives along Alliance from strengthening its defenses and using the axes of advance in three distinct areas-central, north- time gained for mobilization and reinforcement. The ern, and southwestern. (See figure IV-1.) The Pact Soviets hope that the shock and suddenness of the probably would seek to organize its inital attack forces initial Pact offensive would interrupt NATO's mobili- in this theater of military operations (TVD) into three zation, forestall reinforcements, and prevent a pro- fronts which would correspond to these areas of longed period of positional warfare. But they recog- responsibility: nize that this strategy would be complicated by a period of political crisis and tension that almost cer- -Cenfr The ould berhe lrt iesof tainly would precede a war and provide impetus to ble for this area would be the largest in terms of NATOprepratins.forces and would be expected to carry out the main effort. It could be made up of as many as 8. To achieve the force ratios deemed necessary to 28 divisions, including all Soviet forces in East accomplish its objectives, the Pact has evolved mobili- Germany and Poland and all six of East Ger- zation and attack concepts that are intended to maxi- many's ground force divisions. It would have the Table IV-1 Warsaw Pact Ground Force Divisions Available for Initial Use in the Western Theater of Military Operations January 1979 In Central Europe a In the ' - --- In the Soviet NSWP Western USSR b Total Availability by Type: Tank ................. 14 12 14 40 Motorized Rifle 13 17 15 45 Assault Landing -.................- Airborne d . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . - - 1 Total .... ..................... 27 31 29 87 Available Over Time: M-Day+24 Hours ... 7-12 3 - 10-15 M-Day+96 Hours .. 27 13 - 40 M-Day+8 Days .................. 27 31 - 58 M-Day +14 Days ....... . 27 31 29 87 Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. b Forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts. In some circumstances' the four Soviet and six Hungarian divisions in Hungary, as well as the 11 divisions in the Kiev Military District of the USSR, could also be used in the Western Theater of Military Operations. "The Soviets also have eight airborne divisions (including one training division) in the USSR which could be used against NATO in one or more theaters. Three of these divisions are located in the Baltic and Belorussian Military Districts. 'SECRET- IV-2 Top et
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.