Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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A. The Initial Campaign in the Western Theater mize initial combat power, on the assumption that a
of Military Operations war in Europe would be short and, therefore, decided
largely by forces in being or quickly available. (See
The Ground Offensive table IV-1.) Accordingly, the Soviets plan against the
contingency that Pact forces based in Central Europe,
7. Soviet military strategy calls for a massive and about half of them East European, might be required
rapid ground offensive into NATO territory in Central to initiate a Pact offensive campaign and, bypassing
Europe to defeat NATO forces, disrupt mobilization, strong resistance, carry the campaign well into NATO
and seize or destroy ports and airfields to prevent territory before reinforcements would arrive from the
reinforcement. Because this strategy envisions a highly western USSiR
fluid battlefield and high rates of advance, Pact
planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western Theater of Miili-
forward defenses rapidly to prevent the Western tary Operations evidently envisions offensives along
Alliance from strengthening its defenses and using the axes of advance in three distinct areas-central, north-
time gained for mobilization and reinforcement. The ern, and southwestern. (See figure IV-1.) The Pact
Soviets hope that the shock and suddenness of the probably would seek to organize its inital attack forces
initial Pact offensive would interrupt NATO's mobili- in this theater of military operations (TVD) into three
zation, forestall reinforcements, and prevent a pro- fronts which would correspond to these areas of
longed period of positional warfare. But they recog- responsibility:
nize that this strategy would be complicated by a
period of political crisis and tension that almost cer- -Cenfr The ould berhe lrt iesof
tainly would precede a war and provide impetus to ble for this area would be the largest in terms of
NATOprepratins.forces and would be expected to carry out the
main effort. It could be made up of as many as
8. To achieve the force ratios deemed necessary to 28 divisions, including all Soviet forces in East
accomplish its objectives, the Pact has evolved mobili- Germany and Poland and all six of East Ger-
zation and attack concepts that are intended to maxi- many's ground force divisions. It would have the
Table IV-1
Warsaw Pact Ground Force Divisions Available for Initial Use in the Western
Theater of Military Operations
January 1979
In Central Europe a In the
' - --- In the
Soviet NSWP Western USSR b Total
Availability by Type:
Tank ................. 14 12 14 40
Motorized Rifle 13 17 15 45
Assault Landing -.................-
Airborne d . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . - - 1
Total .... ..................... 27 31 29 87
Available Over Time:
M-Day+24 Hours ... 7-12 3 - 10-15
M-Day+96 Hours .. 27 13 - 40
M-Day+8 Days .................. 27 31 - 58
M-Day +14 Days ....... . 27 31 29 87
Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia.
b Forces in the Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military Districts.
In some circumstances' the four Soviet and six Hungarian divisions in Hungary, as well as the 11
divisions in the Kiev Military District of the USSR, could also be used in the Western Theater of Military
Operations.
"The Soviets also have eight airborne divisions (including one training division) in the USSR which
could be used against NATO in one or more theaters. Three of these divisions are located in the Baltic and
Belorussian Military Districts.
'SECRET-
IV-2
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