“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
CHAPTER IV
WARSAW PACT STRATEGY FOR INITIAL CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO
1 This chapter summarizes our understanding of for at least the first week, and the Soviet airlift could
how the Warsaw Pact would organize and prosecute not simultaneously support two major airborne oper-
initial, conventional military operations in a full-scale ations such as those contemplated against the Danish
conflict with NATO. We do not have access to the and Turkish Straits. Moreover, there could be political
Pact's war plans, but we can deduce their general considerations that would lead the Soviets to defer
nature, at least for the opening phases of a war, from attacks on some NATO countries in the hope of
military exercises, from Pact writings on niilitary encouraging their nonbelligerence.
tactics and strategy, and from the current disposition 5. We believe, however, that the need for unfet-
of Pact forces. tered naval operations from their Northern Fleet bases
2. The USSR's geographic position as a major conti- would almost certainly cause the Soviets to strike
A S NATO facilities in northern Norway, and probably tonental power in Europe and Asia, and the Soviet
perception that potentially hostile neighbors confront attempt to occupy some territory there, and that the
the USSR and its allies on virtually every side, have led urgency of this need would lead them to do so
it to develop contingency plans for military operations concurrently with starting an attack in Central Eu-
on all Pact land frontiers. Our information on Soviet rope. We also would expect attacks on NATO naval
concepts for military operations is best for offensive forces in the Mediterranean to occur at the onset of
operations that would be directed against NATO, hostilities in Central Europe. None of the other poten-
especially in Central Europe. The Soviets clearly tial -flank offensives-appear to-have this degree-of
expect Central Europe to be the decisive arena in a urgency, although the Pact would be likely to move
war with NATO and assign it. the highest priority in against the Turkish Straits early in a war. Even if they
the allocation of military manpower and equipment. did not begin ground offensives immediately in some
flank areas, the Pact would almost certainly conduct
3. The Soviets also have plans for offensive action in feints or holding actions intended to keep NATO from
other NATO regions. shifting forces from the flanks to Central Europe,
compel commitment of NATO reserves, and weaken
NATO forces on the flanks in anticipation of further
operations.
6. We have considered the question of whether the
Soviets could rely on their Warsaw Pact allies to
.__participate willingly and effectively in hostilities
against NATO and have concluded that no categorical
4. We have little direct evidence on the Pact's view answer is possible. The extent of reliability in non-
of the timing of these flank offensives in relation to an Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries would depend
offensive in Central Europe. We judge, however, that chiefly upon the circumstances under which NSWP
the Pact would be unlikely to start a war by mounting forces became engaged in war with NATO. The
major ground offensives against all NATO sectors period of tension before hostilities would allow the
simultaneously. To do so would unnecessarily extend Soviets to manipulate popular attitudes and political
available Pact forces, airlift, and air and logistic leaders. In addition, the Pact's mobilization would be
support and would complicate command and control set in motion and its momentum would carry military
at the General Staff and Supreme High Command preparations forward. Refusal on the part of an NSWP
levels. The planned Pact air offensive in Central country to participate at this stage could be dealt with
Europe would tie up the bulk of the Pact's tactical air by force. In sum, the East Europeans would feel they
forces and Soviet intermediate-range bomber forces had little choice but to fight on behalf of the Pact.
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