Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
CHAPTER IV WARSAW PACT STRATEGY FOR INITIAL CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO 1 This chapter summarizes our understanding of for at least the first week, and the Soviet airlift could how the Warsaw Pact would organize and prosecute not simultaneously support two major airborne oper- initial, conventional military operations in a full-scale ations such as those contemplated against the Danish conflict with NATO. We do not have access to the and Turkish Straits. Moreover, there could be political Pact's war plans, but we can deduce their general considerations that would lead the Soviets to defer nature, at least for the opening phases of a war, from attacks on some NATO countries in the hope of military exercises, from Pact writings on niilitary encouraging their nonbelligerence. tactics and strategy, and from the current disposition 5. We believe, however, that the need for unfet- of Pact forces. tered naval operations from their Northern Fleet bases 2. The USSR's geographic position as a major conti- would almost certainly cause the Soviets to strike A S NATO facilities in northern Norway, and probably tonental power in Europe and Asia, and the Soviet perception that potentially hostile neighbors confront attempt to occupy some territory there, and that the the USSR and its allies on virtually every side, have led urgency of this need would lead them to do so it to develop contingency plans for military operations concurrently with starting an attack in Central Eu- on all Pact land frontiers. Our information on Soviet rope. We also would expect attacks on NATO naval concepts for military operations is best for offensive forces in the Mediterranean to occur at the onset of operations that would be directed against NATO, hostilities in Central Europe. None of the other poten- especially in Central Europe. The Soviets clearly tial -flank offensives-appear to-have this degree-of expect Central Europe to be the decisive arena in a urgency, although the Pact would be likely to move war with NATO and assign it. the highest priority in against the Turkish Straits early in a war. Even if they the allocation of military manpower and equipment. did not begin ground offensives immediately in some flank areas, the Pact would almost certainly conduct 3. The Soviets also have plans for offensive action in feints or holding actions intended to keep NATO from other NATO regions. shifting forces from the flanks to Central Europe, compel commitment of NATO reserves, and weaken NATO forces on the flanks in anticipation of further operations. 6. We have considered the question of whether the Soviets could rely on their Warsaw Pact allies to .__participate willingly and effectively in hostilities against NATO and have concluded that no categorical 4. We have little direct evidence on the Pact's view answer is possible. The extent of reliability in non- of the timing of these flank offensives in relation to an Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries would depend offensive in Central Europe. We judge, however, that chiefly upon the circumstances under which NSWP the Pact would be unlikely to start a war by mounting forces became engaged in war with NATO. The major ground offensives against all NATO sectors period of tension before hostilities would allow the simultaneously. To do so would unnecessarily extend Soviets to manipulate popular attitudes and political available Pact forces, airlift, and air and logistic leaders. In addition, the Pact's mobilization would be support and would complicate command and control set in motion and its momentum would carry military at the General Staff and Supreme High Command preparations forward. Refusal on the part of an NSWP levels. The planned Pact air offensive in Central country to participate at this stage could be dealt with Europe would tie up the bulk of the Pact's tactical air by force. In sum, the East Europeans would feel they forces and Soviet intermediate-range bomber forces had little choice but to fight on behalf of the Pact. TV-e
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.