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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 114 …recently halted Soviet air operations from Conakry. These developments will obviously force the 257. Many officers…
  • p. 115 …order to keep other in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational. of communication…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets could elect to provide combat forces scale commitment of manpower and materiel which to…
  • p. 187 …This force is occasionally aug- forces could not be safely transported by sea or air to…
  • p. 188 …a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few recently introduced Flogger…
CHAPTER IV
WARSAW PACT STRATEGY FOR INITIAL CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS AGAINST NATO
1 This chapter summarizes our understanding of for at least the first week, and the Soviet airlift could
how the Warsaw Pact would organize and prosecute not simultaneously support two major airborne oper-
initial, conventional military operations in a full-scale ations such as those contemplated against the Danish
conflict with NATO. We do not have access to the and Turkish Straits. Moreover, there could be political
Pact's war plans, but we can deduce their general considerations that would lead the Soviets to defer
nature, at least for the opening phases of a war, from attacks on some NATO countries in the hope of
military exercises, from Pact writings on niilitary encouraging their nonbelligerence.
tactics and strategy, and from the current disposition 5. We believe, however, that the need for unfet-
of Pact forces. tered naval operations from their Northern Fleet bases
2. The USSR's geographic position as a major conti- would almost certainly cause the Soviets to strike
A S NATO facilities in northern Norway, and probably tonental power in Europe and Asia, and the Soviet
perception that potentially hostile neighbors confront attempt to occupy some territory there, and that the
the USSR and its allies on virtually every side, have led urgency of this need would lead them to do so
it to develop contingency plans for military operations concurrently with starting an attack in Central Eu-
on all Pact land frontiers. Our information on Soviet rope. We also would expect attacks on NATO naval
concepts for military operations is best for offensive forces in the Mediterranean to occur at the onset of
operations that would be directed against NATO, hostilities in Central Europe. None of the other poten-
especially in Central Europe. The Soviets clearly tial -flank offensives-appear to-have this degree-of
expect Central Europe to be the decisive arena in a urgency, although the Pact would be likely to move
war with NATO and assign it. the highest priority in against the Turkish Straits early in a war. Even if they
the allocation of military manpower and equipment. did not begin ground offensives immediately in some
flank areas, the Pact would almost certainly conduct
3. The Soviets also have plans for offensive action in feints or holding actions intended to keep NATO from
other NATO regions. shifting forces from the flanks to Central Europe,
compel commitment of NATO reserves, and weaken
NATO forces on the flanks in anticipation of further
operations.
6. We have considered the question of whether the
Soviets could rely on their Warsaw Pact allies to
.__participate willingly and effectively in hostilities
against NATO and have concluded that no categorical
4. We have little direct evidence on the Pact's view answer is possible. The extent of reliability in non-
of the timing of these flank offensives in relation to an Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries would depend
offensive in Central Europe. We judge, however, that chiefly upon the circumstances under which NSWP
the Pact would be unlikely to start a war by mounting forces became engaged in war with NATO. The
major ground offensives against all NATO sectors period of tension before hostilities would allow the
simultaneously. To do so would unnecessarily extend Soviets to manipulate popular attitudes and political
available Pact forces, airlift, and air and logistic leaders. In addition, the Pact's mobilization would be
support and would complicate command and control set in motion and its momentum would carry military
at the General Staff and Supreme High Command preparations forward. Refusal on the part of an NSWP
levels. The planned Pact air offensive in Central country to participate at this stage could be dealt with
Europe would tie up the bulk of the Pact's tactical air by force. In sum, the East Europeans would feel they
forces and Soviet intermediate-range bomber forces had little choice but to fight on behalf of the Pact.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.