Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
Top Zaet Fleets being fielded. Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime, the Pact would have two combined port at army level and above. fleets opposite NATO: the Baltic and Black Sea Com- bined Fleets, both under Soviet Command. The Com- bined Baltic Fleet would consist of elements from the Soviet Baltic Fleet and from the Polish and East German Navies. The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the Romanian and Bulgarian Navies. The Soviets' North- 18. Soviet military writings indicate that, at times, ern Fleet and the Soviet Fifth Squadron (Eskadra) in the actions of theater commands (High Commands) the Mediterranean would support Pact operations and front commands would be coordinated and moni- under the control of the Main Naval Staff in Moscow, tored by representatives of the VGK and General Staff although in some cases control might be exercised by deployed from Moscow to the field. These representa- continental theater-level commands. tives would interpret the VGK's orders, report on progress and problems, and help the commanders B. Measures for Control of Combined obtain support from Moscow command authorities. Operations 19. Representatives of the Headquarters of the 14. The Soviets intend to maintain centralized con- Warsaw Pact-all Soviet officers-provide liaison be- trol of all Pact military operations. To this end they tween Pact headquarters and national general staffs have devised a variety of mechanisms to facilitate and monitor NSWP forces to ensure conformity with their control over Pact planning, training, and Soviet requirements. Except in Romania, these repre- communications. sentatives appear to have access to most aspects of NSWP military decisionmaking, planning, and oper- War Plans ations. They have large staffs to assist them and special communications that provide access to key NSWP 15. The Soviet General Staff develops strategic ob- leaders as well as to the Pact's Headquarters and the jectives for the Pact, and assigns specific missions and Soviet General Staff. Also, senior Soviet officers are planning guidelines to Soviet commands and to the assigned to all major NSWP command elements and, General Staffs of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) at least in East Germany, down to division level. We countries. In turn, these commands and staffs prepare expect these officers would remain at their posts detailed operational plans and NSWP planners obtain during wartime. national approval. The Soviet General Staff reviews and gives final approval to all plans to ensure that Operations Groups operations are fully integrated throughout the theater and consistent with the accomplishment of Soviet 20. The use of operations groups to perform liaison objectives. and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups Standardization were used during World War II to integrate Soviet and East European. operations and are widely used in 16. The adoption of Soviet military doctrine in the contemporary exercises. Officers and supporting com- NSWP forces has produced a high degree of standard- munications elements are sent from service headquar- ization in training and command and control proce- ters to major field commands, from superior to subor- dures. This doctrine is propagated by frequent exer- dinate echelons, and laterally between commands to cises and by training NSWP officers in Soviet military facilitate coordination. In the Pact context, perhaps academies. It is reinforced by the use of Russian as the the most important operations groups would be those official language for combined Pact military oper- sent to NSWP fronts by local Soviet headquarters to ations and by various standard operating procedures integrate those NSWP fronts into the overall Soviet and formats that minimize language difficulties. General Staff command system. 17. Pact standardization is being increasingly reflected in communications equipment and'in auto- mated command and staff information support sys- tems. Common radio equipment of various types is II1-7 TopSec:et
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.