“Mission Control”29 pages
- p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such
as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais-
sance data link…
- p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have
missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
- p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
- p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either
broad range of missions…
- p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled
The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
- p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
- p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and
commanders are expected to be closely…
- p. 59 …Frontal
Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft
reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
- p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand-
facilities, hardening command and control facilities,
and establishing pipeline…
- p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide
the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions
when…
- p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
- p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance
those two seas…
- p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control
110…
- p. 84 …this mission.
The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
- p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
- p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans
other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
- p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include,
sidual forces…
- p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and
integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
- p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links.
rated composite or…
- p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified
missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
- p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform
their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
- p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with
flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
- p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at-
and…
- p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob-
to cope…
- p. 175 …be building a
mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
- p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
- p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
- p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from
rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
- p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The
against US carrier and…
Top
Other recently completed National Intelligence Estimates and
Interagency Intelligence Memorandums contain cornmprehensive assess-
ments of some issues that are given summary treatment in this
document.
- NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global
Power Arena, describes the broad strategic and political
considerations which shape the Soviet defense posture.
- NiE 4-1-78, Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilitiesfor Going
to War in Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War,
assesses Pact attack options in Central Europe and the
intelligence basis for our estimate of NATO's warning time
there.
- NIE 11-3/8-78, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear
Conflict Through the Late 1980s, and NIE 11-6-78, Soviet
Strategic Forces for Peripheral Attack, contain detailed
estimates of Soviet strategic forces available for use against
NATO.
- NIE 11-10-79, Soviet Military Capabilities To Project Power
and Influence in Distant Areas.
- NI IIM 78-10018J, Indications and Warning of Soviet
Intentions To Use Chemical Weapons During a NATO-
Warsaw Pact War.
- N1 1IM 78-10029, Assessed Manpower of Warsaw Pact Forces
in the NATO Guidelines Area.
- NI IIM 78-10027J, A Survey of Warsaw Pact Concealment,
Deception, and Intelligence Denial Activity.
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