Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
Top Soviet Command Authorities: Transition to Wartime Figure 11-2 Politburo a Politburo 13 Voting 13 Voting National Members Political Defense Council Authority Brezhnev (Chairman) Defense Council Kosygin or Equivalent Body Ustinov (Minister of Defense) and a few others Supreme High Command Supreme Commander in Chief National Minister (Party General Secretary) of Collegium Stavka Military Defense 11 to 20 Members Authority Gener ",j Armed A Unclassified 579034 - include numerous separate combat and combat-sup- port elements such as tank, artillery, missile, and air defense units. Large service-support elements would provide the front with transport, maintenance, engi- neering, supply, and medical support. The Soviet front Armies and Divisions in East Germany could total more than 500,000 men 12. The headquarters staffs and communications after full mobilization; a more typical front would support elements of armies and divisions also routinely have some 300,000 to 400,000 men. participate in exercises. When these commands are 1. The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man front headquarters in wartime. Since the late munications for their command posts. Most armies and 1960s, Soviet military district staffs have been aug- independent divisions would be subordinate to fronts, mented in order to be able to provide staff for front but some may be withheld as strategic reserves under headquarters when created. East European front staffs the control of the VGK or theater commanders. All have been predesignated in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Soviet armies have direct communications with the and probably Bulgaria. These front command and General Staff and normally receive communications control elements are routinely tinder national control support from signal units of the Committee of State in peacetime_ Security (KGB) and of the Reserves of the Supreme High Command (RVGK). 3 - -_ lll-4
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.