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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Top et
8. In considering a future war with NATO, Soviet
THEATER COMMANDS strategists envision widespread combat operations
encompassing all of Europe and extending into the
The Soviets define a theater of war (teatr North Atlantic. Accordingly, they plan to divide the
voyny-TV) as the territory of any one continent, Western TV into three land TVDs in which they
together with the sea areas adjoining it and the expect Pact and NATO forces to come in conflict. (See
airspace above it, on which hostilities may de- figure 111-4.)
velop-for example, the European Theater of
War. A TV usually includes several TVDs. An- - The Northwestern TVD. Based on the Soviet
other TV presumably would be established in the Leningrad Military District, this theater would
eastern USSR against China and enemy forces in encompass the Scandinavian Peninsula and im-
the Pacific region. Not all of the national forces mediately adjacent waters.
would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include,
sidual forces would be retained under national on the Pact side, Soviet and East European forces
control as territorial defense forces for rear area in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
security and as strategic national reserves. and Soviet forces in the western USSR; and, on
A theater of military operations (teatr voyen- the NATO side, West Germany, the Benelux
nykh deystviy-TVD) is defined as a particular nations, Denmark, and possibly France and
territory, together with the associated airspace northern Spain. Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be included in this TVD.
within whose limits a known part of the armed - The Southwestern TVD. Soviet planners envi-
forces of the country (or coalition) operates in sion military operations against Greece and Tur-
wartime, engaged in strategic missions which key and probably northern Italy and Austria.
ensue from the war plan. A TVD may be ground, This theater would also include the Black and
maritime, or intercontinental. According to their Mediterranean Seas.
military-political and economic importance,
TVDs are classified as main or secondary. 9. The Soviets also expect major naval operations
against NATO in the North Atlantic to occur in
conjunction with a conflict in Europe. The equivalent
Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater of the TVD in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD,
headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime Theater of Military Operations. We are
mand posts have been constructed for at least some less certain about the approximate boundaries of
Pact wartime headquarters, however. MTVDs than we are about those of TVDs. Operations,
exercises, and documentary evidence suggest that the
Western Theater of War: The Warsaw Pact High Soviets would regard an area in the Norwegian Sea
Command north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
(G-1-UK) gap as an MTVD.
7. Arrangements for exercising control of Pact
forces within what the Soviets call the Western (or Fronts
European) Theater of War have been evolving over 10. Regardless of what echelons of command are
the last few years. Although ultimate control of all created to integrate wartime theater-level and strate-
Pact operations continues to be the VGK and the gic operations, the senior tactical command would be
Soviet General Staff, we now have evidence that the front. Although not directly comparable to any
indicates the commander in chief of the combined Western organization, the front would be similar to
armed forces of the Warsaw Pact would control all the NATO army group in size, level of command, and
Pact forces in this theater in wartime. We are less function. A front would usually consist of three to five
certain of how he would do this-whether the High ground armies, each including three to five tank or
Command of the Warsaw Pact would become a motorized rifle divisions, and an air army of as many
component of the Soviet High Command with the as several hundred tactical aircraft. A front operating
responsibility for operational control over forces with- in a maritime sector might also control any naval
in the Western Theater or whether it would form a elements which were chiefly devoted to that front's
separate command entity. mission. The ground forces of the front would also
111-3
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.