Documents / FOIA release

Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Top et
8. In considering a future war with NATO, Soviet
THEATER COMMANDS strategists envision widespread combat operations
encompassing all of Europe and extending into the
The Soviets define a theater of war (teatr North Atlantic. Accordingly, they plan to divide the
voyny-TV) as the territory of any one continent, Western TV into three land TVDs in which they
together with the sea areas adjoining it and the expect Pact and NATO forces to come in conflict. (See
airspace above it, on which hostilities may de- figure 111-4.)
velop-for example, the European Theater of
War. A TV usually includes several TVDs. An- - The Northwestern TVD. Based on the Soviet
other TV presumably would be established in the Leningrad Military District, this theater would
eastern USSR against China and enemy forces in encompass the Scandinavian Peninsula and im-
the Pacific region. Not all of the national forces mediately adjacent waters.
would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include,
sidual forces would be retained under national on the Pact side, Soviet and East European forces
control as territorial defense forces for rear area in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
security and as strategic national reserves. and Soviet forces in the western USSR; and, on
A theater of military operations (teatr voyen- the NATO side, West Germany, the Benelux
nykh deystviy-TVD) is defined as a particular nations, Denmark, and possibly France and
territory, together with the associated airspace northern Spain. Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be included in this TVD.
within whose limits a known part of the armed - The Southwestern TVD. Soviet planners envi-
forces of the country (or coalition) operates in sion military operations against Greece and Tur-
wartime, engaged in strategic missions which key and probably northern Italy and Austria.
ensue from the war plan. A TVD may be ground, This theater would also include the Black and
maritime, or intercontinental. According to their Mediterranean Seas.
military-political and economic importance,
TVDs are classified as main or secondary. 9. The Soviets also expect major naval operations
against NATO in the North Atlantic to occur in
conjunction with a conflict in Europe. The equivalent
Unlike NATO, the Warsaw Pact does not have theater of the TVD in Soviet maritime strategy is the MTVD,
headquarters in being in peacetime. Hardened com- the Maritime Theater of Military Operations. We are
mand posts have been constructed for at least some less certain about the approximate boundaries of
Pact wartime headquarters, however. MTVDs than we are about those of TVDs. Operations,
exercises, and documentary evidence suggest that the
Western Theater of War: The Warsaw Pact High Soviets would regard an area in the Norwegian Sea
Command north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
(G-1-UK) gap as an MTVD.
7. Arrangements for exercising control of Pact
forces within what the Soviets call the Western (or Fronts
European) Theater of War have been evolving over 10. Regardless of what echelons of command are
the last few years. Although ultimate control of all created to integrate wartime theater-level and strate-
Pact operations continues to be the VGK and the gic operations, the senior tactical command would be
Soviet General Staff, we now have evidence that the front. Although not directly comparable to any
indicates the commander in chief of the combined Western organization, the front would be similar to
armed forces of the Warsaw Pact would control all the NATO army group in size, level of command, and
Pact forces in this theater in wartime. We are less function. A front would usually consist of three to five
certain of how he would do this-whether the High ground armies, each including three to five tank or
Command of the Warsaw Pact would become a motorized rifle divisions, and an air army of as many
component of the Soviet High Command with the as several hundred tactical aircraft. A front operating
responsibility for operational control over forces with- in a maritime sector might also control any naval
in the Western Theater or whether it would form a elements which were chiefly devoted to that front's
separate command entity. mission. The ground forces of the front would also
111-3
Tap aLa

Not linked to a story yet.

About this file

FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.