Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“The Advance”37 pages
Top e CHAPTER III WARSAW PACT COMMAND AND CONTROL 1. The Pact's success in achieving its wartime objec- A. The Wartime Command Structure tives would depend on its ability to control and 4. The ultimate authority for the direction of the coordinate multinational, joint-service operations of Soviet military rests with the Politburo of the Cornmu- great complexity. individual member na- nist Party of the Soviet Union. The wartime role of the tions have the command and control elements neces- Politburo is unclear, but its involvement as a group sary to form the Pact's wartime control structure, C would probably be limited to only the most crucial decisions. A subset of the Politburo, the Defense Council, establishes military policy and makes funda- mental decisions regarding the employment of mili- tary forces. We believe that the Defense Council would form the nucleus of a largely civilian national 2. In peacetime, the Warsaw Pact headduirters defense command organ. This body does not control the armed forces of member states would consider all defense issues and provide broad Each state controls its armed forces through its national guidelines for the conduct of military operations. command authority, which is made up of key party, government, and military leaders. (See figure 1II-1.) 5. Brezhnev, predesignated as Supreme Commander Operational control of national forces is exercised by in Chief, would lead a Supreme High Command each country's general staff. Overall Pact defense (Verkhovnoye Glavnokomandovaniye-VGK) drawn planning is coordinated among Pact members, but the from elements of the Ministry of Defense. (See figure process is clearly Soviet dominated. III-3.) This command would constitute the military- strategic leadership over all Pact military operations 3. Establishment of the Pact wartime command against NATO. The VGK probably includes at least system is not automatic. It entails authoritative release the three first deputy ministers of defense and the of forces from national control and their subordination commanders in chief of the five components of the to the Pact's high command.' Political and military Soviet armed forces. One of the Soviet first deputy consultations between senior Pact leaders would be ministers of defense (currently, Marshal Kulikov) is necessary to coordinate preparations for war. These the commander in chief of the combined armed forces consultations could be made in person or by telephone. of the Warsaw Pact member states. The Soviet Gener- There are telecommunication systems connecting East al Staff is the executive agent of the VGK and, as such, European capitals and Moscow which can provide is the focal point for operational control of Soviet Euroeancapi~lsandMoscw wichcatmproide armed forces and those of the Pact in wartime. secure communications for telephone consultations. East European and Soviet national command authori- 6. We believe that, should a war occur between the ties also have special secure communications at their Warsaw Pact and NATO, theater commands (see disposal. inset) would be established and exercise direct oper- ational control over fronts and fleets and at least some ' For a detailed treatment of the alert and mobilization Proce- degree of control over those strategic assets allocated to dures and the peacetime readiness and Pact forces, see NIE 4-1-78, support theater operations. The Soviets refer to these Warsaw Pact Concepts and Capabilities for Coing to War in commands as High Commands of troops in a Theater Europe: Implications for NATO Warning of War. -of War (TV) or Theater of Military Operations (TVD). II-i
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.