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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
260. To be effective in wartime, these forward to rearm individual combatants and submarines at
bases would require stockpiles of nonperishable food- least several times.
stuffs, ammunition (including miesiles and torpedoes,
with both conventional and nuclear warheads), POL, 263. oThere is very little information on the avail-
spare parts, and some form of repair capability. Much ability of spare parts at naval bases, ship repair yards,
of this could be made available by pre-positioning and supply depot complexes. Nonetheless we estimate
naval auxiliaries or merchant ships. y a prolonged that the fleet rear services organizations maintain
nar, these bases and auxiliaries would themselves sufficient stocks in dispersed locations to sustain corn-
require resupply. We have no evidence of stockpiling, batants and submarines through at least 90 to 120 days
however, certainly not in quantities sufficient to sus- of combat operations. During that time, defense indus-
tain combat operations. Nor do we believe the Soviet tries could continue to produce replacements for high-
Union is capable of replenishing such bases and auxil- usage items. Damaged ships could be selected for
iaries in time of war, primarily because of the difficulty cannibalization, as necessary, in order to keep other
in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational.
of communication. In sum, in terms of wartime 264. The railroad and highway networks south of
sustainability. Soviet forward facilities in Africa, the Leningrad and west of the Urals are sufficiently well
Caribbean, and Indian Ocean littoral are, for the developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be supported in wartime from the industrial and
261. Logistic Support Afloat. To provide direct agricultural heartland. The Northern Fleet, however,
support of combat operations we believe modern naval has no highway connecting it with points south. It is
replenishment oilers will operate in the combat zone to served only by the inland waterway system and single
satisfy fuel requirements through underway replenish- rail lines to Arkhangel'sk and to Murmansk; from
ment. In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to
afloat logistics group-comprising naval or merchant bases farther north. Naval airbases of the Northern
and fishing fleet oilers, ammunition ships, missile Fleet are similarly isolated. Since the Northern Fleet
support ships, repair ships or tenders, combat stores probably would be the most active of the fleets in
ships, and merchant fleet cargo ships-at a point in wartime, it would place greater demands upon the
the Greenland Sea between Jan Mayen Island and rear services system than the others. We estimate that
North Cape. They in turn would be supplied by naval stockpiles of POL, munitions and spares, and supplies
auxiliaries or ships of the' merchant and fishing fleets of foodstuffs in all three fleet areas could be replen-
shuttling back and forth to Northern Fleet bases. This ished as required, as long as the overland lines of
concept has the advantage of greatly reducing transit communication remain serviceable.
time between the combat zone and rear services
support bases and increasing the availability of ships 265. We have not identified any maintenance or
for cornbat operations. We estimate the Soviets would logistic problems in Soviet Naval Aviation which
deploy modern replenishment oilers to operate in close would significantly inhibit sustained combat oper-
proximity to combatants, but we do not believe they ations from its main airfields. Adequate fuel for
would establish an afloat logistic group in an open- extended operations is apparently available and the
oen aetab Soviets produce large numbers of expendable combatocean area. items such as sonobuoys and cruise missiles, many of
262. Support in Fleet Areas. Analysis of fleet fuel which are stored at or near the main naval airfields.
stocks and combatant availability shows that sufficient Intensive and continuous combat operations at maxi-
naval fuel reserves are held in the Black Sea, Baltic mum effort for more than a week at a time could
and Northern Fleets to sustain wartime operations for severely strain aircrews and the maintenance system,
at least 90, 150, and 80 days, respectively. Commercial and temporarily reduce aircraft availability. More-
marine fuel stocks are not included in this assessment; over, SNA's capability for sustained operations prob-
if included, they would more than double the supply ably would be reduced sharply if it were forced to use
for each fleet. We lack precise data on inventories of its reserve airfields for long periods of time because
naval ordnance stored ashore. We believe, however, these airfields seem to have only a limited amount of
that sufficient munitions are stored in each fleet area combat stores and minimum maintenance facilities.
.11-72

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.