Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Sea”60+ pages
260. To be effective in wartime, these forward to rearm individual combatants and submarines at bases would require stockpiles of nonperishable food- least several times. stuffs, ammunition (including miesiles and torpedoes, with both conventional and nuclear warheads), POL, 263. oThere is very little information on the avail- spare parts, and some form of repair capability. Much ability of spare parts at naval bases, ship repair yards, of this could be made available by pre-positioning and supply depot complexes. Nonetheless we estimate naval auxiliaries or merchant ships. y a prolonged that the fleet rear services organizations maintain nar, these bases and auxiliaries would themselves sufficient stocks in dispersed locations to sustain corn- require resupply. We have no evidence of stockpiling, batants and submarines through at least 90 to 120 days however, certainly not in quantities sufficient to sus- of combat operations. During that time, defense indus- tain combat operations. Nor do we believe the Soviet tries could continue to produce replacements for high- Union is capable of replenishing such bases and auxil- usage items. Damaged ships could be selected for iaries in time of war, primarily because of the difficulty cannibalization, as necessary, in order to keep other in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational. of communication. In sum, in terms of wartime 264. The railroad and highway networks south of sustainability. Soviet forward facilities in Africa, the Leningrad and west of the Urals are sufficiently well Caribbean, and Indian Ocean littoral are, for the developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be supported in wartime from the industrial and 261. Logistic Support Afloat. To provide direct agricultural heartland. The Northern Fleet, however, support of combat operations we believe modern naval has no highway connecting it with points south. It is replenishment oilers will operate in the combat zone to served only by the inland waterway system and single satisfy fuel requirements through underway replenish- rail lines to Arkhangel'sk and to Murmansk; from ment. In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to afloat logistics group-comprising naval or merchant bases farther north. Naval airbases of the Northern and fishing fleet oilers, ammunition ships, missile Fleet are similarly isolated. Since the Northern Fleet support ships, repair ships or tenders, combat stores probably would be the most active of the fleets in ships, and merchant fleet cargo ships-at a point in wartime, it would place greater demands upon the the Greenland Sea between Jan Mayen Island and rear services system than the others. We estimate that North Cape. They in turn would be supplied by naval stockpiles of POL, munitions and spares, and supplies auxiliaries or ships of the' merchant and fishing fleets of foodstuffs in all three fleet areas could be replen- shuttling back and forth to Northern Fleet bases. This ished as required, as long as the overland lines of concept has the advantage of greatly reducing transit communication remain serviceable. time between the combat zone and rear services support bases and increasing the availability of ships 265. We have not identified any maintenance or for cornbat operations. We estimate the Soviets would logistic problems in Soviet Naval Aviation which deploy modern replenishment oilers to operate in close would significantly inhibit sustained combat oper- proximity to combatants, but we do not believe they ations from its main airfields. Adequate fuel for would establish an afloat logistic group in an open- extended operations is apparently available and the oen aetab Soviets produce large numbers of expendable combatocean area. items such as sonobuoys and cruise missiles, many of 262. Support in Fleet Areas. Analysis of fleet fuel which are stored at or near the main naval airfields. stocks and combatant availability shows that sufficient Intensive and continuous combat operations at maxi- naval fuel reserves are held in the Black Sea, Baltic mum effort for more than a week at a time could and Northern Fleets to sustain wartime operations for severely strain aircrews and the maintenance system, at least 90, 150, and 80 days, respectively. Commercial and temporarily reduce aircraft availability. More- marine fuel stocks are not included in this assessment; over, SNA's capability for sustained operations prob- if included, they would more than double the supply ably would be reduced sharply if it were forced to use for each fleet. We lack precise data on inventories of its reserve airfields for long periods of time because naval ordnance stored ashore. We believe, however, these airfields seem to have only a limited amount of that sufficient munitions are stored in each fleet area combat stores and minimum maintenance facilities. .11-72
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.