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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
260. To be effective in wartime, these forward to rearm individual combatants and submarines at
bases would require stockpiles of nonperishable food- least several times.
stuffs, ammunition (including miesiles and torpedoes,
with both conventional and nuclear warheads), POL, 263. oThere is very little information on the avail-
spare parts, and some form of repair capability. Much ability of spare parts at naval bases, ship repair yards,
of this could be made available by pre-positioning and supply depot complexes. Nonetheless we estimate
naval auxiliaries or merchant ships. y a prolonged that the fleet rear services organizations maintain
nar, these bases and auxiliaries would themselves sufficient stocks in dispersed locations to sustain corn-
require resupply. We have no evidence of stockpiling, batants and submarines through at least 90 to 120 days
however, certainly not in quantities sufficient to sus- of combat operations. During that time, defense indus-
tain combat operations. Nor do we believe the Soviet tries could continue to produce replacements for high-
Union is capable of replenishing such bases and auxil- usage items. Damaged ships could be selected for
iaries in time of war, primarily because of the difficulty cannibalization, as necessary, in order to keep other
in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational.
of communication. In sum, in terms of wartime 264. The railroad and highway networks south of
sustainability. Soviet forward facilities in Africa, the Leningrad and west of the Urals are sufficiently well
Caribbean, and Indian Ocean littoral are, for the developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be supported in wartime from the industrial and
261. Logistic Support Afloat. To provide direct agricultural heartland. The Northern Fleet, however,
support of combat operations we believe modern naval has no highway connecting it with points south. It is
replenishment oilers will operate in the combat zone to served only by the inland waterway system and single
satisfy fuel requirements through underway replenish- rail lines to Arkhangel'sk and to Murmansk; from
ment. In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to
afloat logistics group-comprising naval or merchant bases farther north. Naval airbases of the Northern
and fishing fleet oilers, ammunition ships, missile Fleet are similarly isolated. Since the Northern Fleet
support ships, repair ships or tenders, combat stores probably would be the most active of the fleets in
ships, and merchant fleet cargo ships-at a point in wartime, it would place greater demands upon the
the Greenland Sea between Jan Mayen Island and rear services system than the others. We estimate that
North Cape. They in turn would be supplied by naval stockpiles of POL, munitions and spares, and supplies
auxiliaries or ships of the' merchant and fishing fleets of foodstuffs in all three fleet areas could be replen-
shuttling back and forth to Northern Fleet bases. This ished as required, as long as the overland lines of
concept has the advantage of greatly reducing transit communication remain serviceable.
time between the combat zone and rear services
support bases and increasing the availability of ships 265. We have not identified any maintenance or
for cornbat operations. We estimate the Soviets would logistic problems in Soviet Naval Aviation which
deploy modern replenishment oilers to operate in close would significantly inhibit sustained combat oper-
proximity to combatants, but we do not believe they ations from its main airfields. Adequate fuel for
would establish an afloat logistic group in an open- extended operations is apparently available and the
oen aetab Soviets produce large numbers of expendable combatocean area. items such as sonobuoys and cruise missiles, many of
262. Support in Fleet Areas. Analysis of fleet fuel which are stored at or near the main naval airfields.
stocks and combatant availability shows that sufficient Intensive and continuous combat operations at maxi-
naval fuel reserves are held in the Black Sea, Baltic mum effort for more than a week at a time could
and Northern Fleets to sustain wartime operations for severely strain aircrews and the maintenance system,
at least 90, 150, and 80 days, respectively. Commercial and temporarily reduce aircraft availability. More-
marine fuel stocks are not included in this assessment; over, SNA's capability for sustained operations prob-
if included, they would more than double the supply ably would be reduced sharply if it were forced to use
for each fleet. We lack precise data on inventories of its reserve airfields for long periods of time because
naval ordnance stored ashore. We believe, however, these airfields seem to have only a limited amount of
that sufficient munitions are stored in each fleet area combat stores and minimum maintenance facilities.
.11-72

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