Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“US Navy”42 pages
operations regularly use naval communications cir- cuits. Many merchant ships are drilled in or have onboard instructions for the use of naval communica- tions, and it appears that all merchant ships are at least nominally prepared for being placed rapidly under naval control in a crisis. In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control, an option it occasionally exer- cises. Merchant and naval distress communications traffic continues to indicate that a central authority is cognizant of the location of all merchant shipping on a near-real-time, 24-hour basis. The Soviets view naval command and control over merchant shipping as a routine measure which can be widely implemented in an emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of hostilities and subsequently, selected merchant marine ships which are not already under Navy control and perhaps a few fishing fleet assets probably would be directed to relatively safe locales where they could service combatants or naval auxiliaries and become part of the logistic force. 255. In the past, damage control in the Soviet Navy 258. In view of the limitations of most Soviet naval has been grossly deficient. Over the past two years, auxiliaries for conducting underway replenishment, however, the Soviets have placed new emphasis on we believe that only those naval oilers capable of improved damage control readiness. Recent evidence. underway refueling would operate in the general area indicates that the fleet leadership is paying increased of combat operations. All other support ships, both attention to this critical aspect of seamanship. For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are being their presence in combat areas. reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide observe until about two years ago. naval operations the Soviets continue to seek access to 256. Other Maritime Assets. The foregoing esti- foreign shore facilities for logistic purposes, major mates of sustainability were derived on the assumption repairs, communications, and support of aircraft de- that only naval auxiliary support ships would be ployments. They receive POL products in a small available during the initial stages of conflict. The number of selected ports. Various, levels of repair merchant fleet, however, is routinely employed to support are available at shore facilities in Yugoslavia, augment the naval auxiliary force, and we expect this Syria, Tunisia, and Cuba, and from Soviet Navy repair ships in protected anchorages or in port in Angola and support to continue in wartime. Merchant tankers the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY). currently arovide more than half the fuel elivered to Communications facilities for fleet support have been deployed naval ships, although with the gradually established in Syria, Cuba, Angola, and the PDRY, andincreasing availability of improved naval oilers, that arili ntefrttrecutisaeue ySve portion will diminish. The Navy has an effective airfields in the first three countries are used by Soviet command and control relationship with the merchant Naval Aviation aircraft to stage reconnaissance flights. and fishing fleets and directs those merchant and But the Soviets no longer have the use of port facilities fishing ship operations which may affect naval and airfields in Egypt and Somalia, and the Guinean readiness.- Government recently halted Soviet air operations from Conakry. These developments will obviously force the 257. Many officers in these fleets are also reserve Soviet leadership to continue its search for the use of officers in the Soviet Navy, and occasionally active- port and airfield facilities in Africa and the Indian duty naval officers are assigned to merchant ships with Ocean littoral from which the Soviets can stage air- appropriate cover. Merchant tankers under charter to craft and carry out fleet maintenance during peace- the naval auxiliary tanker fleet to support naval time operations. Il-71 lop ,,8
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.