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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 114 …recently halted Soviet air operations from Conakry. These developments will obviously force the 257. Many officers…
  • p. 115 …order to keep other in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational. of communication…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets could elect to provide combat forces scale commitment of manpower and materiel which to…
  • p. 187 …This force is occasionally aug- forces could not be safely transported by sea or air to…
  • p. 188 …a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few recently introduced Flogger…
operations regularly use naval communications cir-
cuits. Many merchant ships are drilled in or have
onboard instructions for the use of naval communica-
tions, and it appears that all merchant ships are at least
nominally prepared for being placed rapidly under
naval control in a crisis. In addition, the Navy has the
option of using merchant communications circuits for
command and control, an option it occasionally exer-
cises. Merchant and naval distress communications
traffic continues to indicate that a central authority is
cognizant of the location of all merchant shipping on a
near-real-time, 24-hour basis. The Soviets view naval
command and control over merchant shipping as a
routine measure which can be widely implemented in
an emergency without the necessity of advanced
notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin-
ning of hostilities and subsequently, selected merchant
marine ships which are not already under Navy
control and perhaps a few fishing fleet assets probably
would be directed to relatively safe locales where they
could service combatants or naval auxiliaries and
become part of the logistic force.
255. In the past, damage control in the Soviet Navy 258. In view of the limitations of most Soviet naval
has been grossly deficient. Over the past two years, auxiliaries for conducting underway replenishment,
however, the Soviets have placed new emphasis on we believe that only those naval oilers capable of
improved damage control readiness. Recent evidence. underway refueling would operate in the general area
indicates that the fleet leadership is paying increased of combat operations. All other support ships, both
attention to this critical aspect of seamanship. For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are being their presence in combat areas.
reported to fleet headquarters, a practice we did not 259. Forward Basing. To support their worldwide
observe until about two years ago. naval operations the Soviets continue to seek access to
256. Other Maritime Assets. The foregoing esti- foreign shore facilities for logistic purposes, major
mates of sustainability were derived on the assumption repairs, communications, and support of aircraft de-
that only naval auxiliary support ships would be ployments. They receive POL products in a small
available during the initial stages of conflict. The number of selected ports. Various, levels of repair
merchant fleet, however, is routinely employed to support are available at shore facilities in Yugoslavia,
augment the naval auxiliary force, and we expect this Syria, Tunisia, and Cuba, and from Soviet Navy repair
ships in protected anchorages or in port in Angola and
support to continue in wartime. Merchant tankers the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).
currently arovide more than half the fuel elivered to Communications facilities for fleet support have been
deployed naval ships, although with the gradually established in Syria, Cuba, Angola, and the PDRY, andincreasing availability of improved naval oilers, that arili ntefrttrecutisaeue ySve
portion will diminish. The Navy has an effective airfields in the first three countries are used by Soviet
command and control relationship with the merchant Naval Aviation aircraft to stage reconnaissance flights.
and fishing fleets and directs those merchant and But the Soviets no longer have the use of port facilities
fishing ship operations which may affect naval and airfields in Egypt and Somalia, and the Guinean
readiness.- Government recently halted Soviet air operations from
Conakry. These developments will obviously force the
257. Many officers in these fleets are also reserve Soviet leadership to continue its search for the use of
officers in the Soviet Navy, and occasionally active- port and airfield facilities in Africa and the Indian
duty naval officers are assigned to merchant ships with Ocean littoral from which the Soviets can stage air-
appropriate cover. Merchant tankers under charter to craft and carry out fleet maintenance during peace-
the naval auxiliary tanker fleet to support naval time operations.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.