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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 8 …I1-41 Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of Communication 11-41…
  • p. 9 …IV-25 Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27 Initial Air and Naval Operations…
  • p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1 ,'- - "''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea Warsaw…
  • p. 20 …An area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 10
  • p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
  • p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force…
  • p. 23 …The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea…
  • p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
  • p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
  • p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
  • p. 54 …7 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle Norwegian divisionCategory I Sea Category II Category…
  • p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
  • p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea, January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
  • p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
  • p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
  • p. 77 lop et Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a Maximum system Payload (kg) Speed…
  • p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b Altitude (m) 18…
  • p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date remain submerged for…
  • p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
  • p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom…
  • p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets…
  • p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
  • p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
  • p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of…
  • p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
  • p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises, radius…
  • p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500) Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
  • p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
  • p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for probably…
  • p. 113 …The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead…
  • p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are…
  • p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
  • p. 118 …Pact operations in the western and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
  • p. 121 …Barents Sea Maritime / T VD 49 shr rri s / Norwegian ICELAND '1 I ' Sea T''f…
  • p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
  • p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7 ~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea North Sea -? - ASNDT1 4... . NETHERLANDS 1…
  • p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front…
  • p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea- HAWK missile belt - Penetration corridor - - North Sea i/ POLAND - West Berlin…
  • p. 144 …This buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
  • p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
  • p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
  • p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the…
  • p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with…
  • p. 149 …southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary…
  • p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
  • p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact…
  • p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
  • p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages…
  • p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities…
  • p. 155 -T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
  • p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table…
  • p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and…
  • p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
  • p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
  • p. 160 …1 Sea control N eMurmansk _ G+UK "r' Gap ''-1 (5Sea denial, ?" Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
  • p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would…
older ships, are the only ones capable of underway ments, these generally have not been adequate. Resup-
refueling alongside. The remaining smaller oilers are ,ply of fresh water remains a major requirement.
restricted to using the bow-to-stern method where only
one ship is serviced, either by replenishment under 251. The Soviet Navy is also deficient in its ability
way at slow speed, by lying dead in the water, or at to replenish dry cargo while under way. Soviet stores
anchor. The Soviets continue to practice the bow-to- and refrigerator ships are not capable of underway
stern method more frequently than alongside refuel- transfer, but the six replenishment oilers in the Soviet
ing. Diesel submarines are fueled at anchor. We western fleets can carry dry cargo and have a limited
believe these limitations would constrain Soviet ability capability to transfer while under way. The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead conduct almost all reprovisioning while
247. A major constraint on extended combat oper- dead in the water, at anchor, or in port.
ations by Soviet missile armed ships and submarines is
their generally small supply of onboard weapons 252. Shipboard Maintenance and Damage Con-
reloads. trol. The sustainability of individual ships in combat is
directly related to the availability of onboard spare
parts and the ability of crews to maintain equipment
under the rigors of combat and to repair battle
damage at sea quickly and effectively. Most modern
combatants and submarines in the Soviet Navy prob-
ably have sufficient spares to permit them to accom-
plish their initial wartime tasks before resorting to
resupply. Although Soviet naval crews probably would
248 The amount of provisions carried aboard prin- be capable of handling most routine repairs, they are
cipal Soviet surface combatants and submarines varies by and large still poorly equipped and trained for
with the age and type of unit. Ships of the Kiev and damage control.
Moskva class, nuclear submarines, and long-range
diesel submarines are believed to carry at least 60 days 253. Because of their heavy reliance on depot main-
of supplies, while Kara and Kresta-Il units and medium- tenance and repair, the Soviets have not developed an
range diesel submarines carry an estimated 40-day extensive capability to maintain and repair ships at
load. The older cruisers and newer destroyers hold sea. Soviet shipboard maintenance and repair prac-
sufficient provisions for 30 (lays of operation, while tices, therefore, are not optimized for sustaining com-
older destroyers and frigates are self-sufficient for bat operations at sea and, in our judgment, would
about 20 days. constitute a constraint on sustained operations. Aboard
ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection
249. The Soviet Navy has the capability for dead- and maintenance system which requires maintenance
in-the-water munitions replenishment but only a mar- to be performed periodically. Much shipboard main-
ginal capability for underway transfer of munitions. tenance and most repairs are accomplished by officers
There have been examples of underway munitions and warrant officers rather than by enlisted personnel
resupply at sea, but, on the whole, the Soviets have because of the low technical proficiency of the latter.
thus far preferred to handle munitions transfer at The officers are extensively trained in their fields of
anchorages and ports. The lack of training in at-sea specialization and are able to repair most routine
munitions resupply, like that of refueling, places a equipment and machinery malfunctions.
limitation on the Soviet Navy's ability to maintain
combat-capable forces at sea for extended periods, 254. Although we have limited information on
particularly in those sea and ocean areas vhere transit Soviet damage control procedures and effectiveness,
times to sources of supply are long. there is ample evidence that damage control requires
improvement. Four major incidents at sea, between
250. Soviet combatants,are deficient in their capa- 1968 and 1974 resulted in substantial casualties and
bility to make fresh water. The Navy requires fresh may have been aggravated by the lack of an effective
water for crews and for boilers of steam-driven ships, damage control organization.
which make up the majority of Soviet principal sur-
face combatants. Although Soviet ships usually have
evaporators to distill seawater for shipboard require-
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.