Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
older ships, are the only ones capable of underway ments, these generally have not been adequate. Resup- refueling alongside. The remaining smaller oilers are ,ply of fresh water remains a major requirement. restricted to using the bow-to-stern method where only one ship is serviced, either by replenishment under 251. The Soviet Navy is also deficient in its ability way at slow speed, by lying dead in the water, or at to replenish dry cargo while under way. Soviet stores anchor. The Soviets continue to practice the bow-to- and refrigerator ships are not capable of underway stern method more frequently than alongside refuel- transfer, but the six replenishment oilers in the Soviet ing. Diesel submarines are fueled at anchor. We western fleets can carry dry cargo and have a limited believe these limitations would constrain Soviet ability capability to transfer while under way. The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead conduct almost all reprovisioning while 247. A major constraint on extended combat oper- dead in the water, at anchor, or in port. ations by Soviet missile armed ships and submarines is their generally small supply of onboard weapons 252. Shipboard Maintenance and Damage Con- reloads. trol. The sustainability of individual ships in combat is directly related to the availability of onboard spare parts and the ability of crews to maintain equipment under the rigors of combat and to repair battle damage at sea quickly and effectively. Most modern combatants and submarines in the Soviet Navy prob- ably have sufficient spares to permit them to accom- plish their initial wartime tasks before resorting to resupply. Although Soviet naval crews probably would 248 The amount of provisions carried aboard prin- be capable of handling most routine repairs, they are cipal Soviet surface combatants and submarines varies by and large still poorly equipped and trained for with the age and type of unit. Ships of the Kiev and damage control. Moskva class, nuclear submarines, and long-range diesel submarines are believed to carry at least 60 days 253. Because of their heavy reliance on depot main- of supplies, while Kara and Kresta-Il units and medium- tenance and repair, the Soviets have not developed an range diesel submarines carry an estimated 40-day extensive capability to maintain and repair ships at load. The older cruisers and newer destroyers hold sea. Soviet shipboard maintenance and repair prac- sufficient provisions for 30 (lays of operation, while tices, therefore, are not optimized for sustaining com- older destroyers and frigates are self-sufficient for bat operations at sea and, in our judgment, would about 20 days. constitute a constraint on sustained operations. Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability for dead- and maintenance system which requires maintenance in-the-water munitions replenishment but only a mar- to be performed periodically. Much shipboard main- ginal capability for underway transfer of munitions. tenance and most repairs are accomplished by officers There have been examples of underway munitions and warrant officers rather than by enlisted personnel resupply at sea, but, on the whole, the Soviets have because of the low technical proficiency of the latter. thus far preferred to handle munitions transfer at The officers are extensively trained in their fields of anchorages and ports. The lack of training in at-sea specialization and are able to repair most routine munitions resupply, like that of refueling, places a equipment and machinery malfunctions. limitation on the Soviet Navy's ability to maintain combat-capable forces at sea for extended periods, 254. Although we have limited information on particularly in those sea and ocean areas vhere transit Soviet damage control procedures and effectiveness, times to sources of supply are long. there is ample evidence that damage control requires improvement. Four major incidents at sea, between 250. Soviet combatants,are deficient in their capa- 1968 and 1974 resulted in substantial casualties and bility to make fresh water. The Navy requires fresh may have been aggravated by the lack of an effective water for crews and for boilers of steam-driven ships, damage control organization. which make up the majority of Soviet principal sur- face combatants. Although Soviet ships usually have evaporators to distill seawater for shipboard require- 11-70 Topee
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.