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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 8 …I1-41 Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of Communication 11-41…
  • p. 9 …IV-25 Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27 Initial Air and Naval Operations…
  • p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1 ,'- - "''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea Warsaw…
  • p. 20 …An area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 10
  • p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
  • p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force…
  • p. 23 …The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea…
  • p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
  • p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
  • p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
  • p. 54 …7 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle Norwegian divisionCategory I Sea Category II Category…
  • p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
  • p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea, January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
  • p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
  • p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
  • p. 77 lop et Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a Maximum system Payload (kg) Speed…
  • p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b Altitude (m) 18…
  • p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date remain submerged for…
  • p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
  • p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom…
  • p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets…
  • p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
  • p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
  • p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of…
  • p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
  • p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises, radius…
  • p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500) Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
  • p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
  • p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for probably…
  • p. 113 …The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead…
  • p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are…
  • p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
  • p. 118 …Pact operations in the western and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
  • p. 121 …Barents Sea Maritime / T VD 49 shr rri s / Norwegian ICELAND '1 I ' Sea T''f…
  • p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
  • p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7 ~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea North Sea -? - ASNDT1 4... . NETHERLANDS 1…
  • p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front…
  • p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea- HAWK missile belt - Penetration corridor - - North Sea i/ POLAND - West Berlin…
  • p. 144 …This buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
  • p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
  • p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
  • p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the…
  • p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with…
  • p. 149 …southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary…
  • p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
  • p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact…
  • p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
  • p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages…
  • p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities…
  • p. 155 -T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
  • p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table…
  • p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and…
  • p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
  • p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
  • p. 160 …1 Sea control N eMurmansk _ G+UK "r' Gap ''-1 (5Sea denial, ?" Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
  • p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would…
Top e
ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the outcome of a prolonged
of air-to-surface missiles. These quantities would sup- conflict by reducing the combat sortie sustainability
port a surge period of one day for Backfire, Badger, rate.
and Blinder aircraft of Long Range Aviation and a 242. Two other factors will have an effect on sortie
three-day surge period for Soviet and NSWP tactical rate, even in a short conflict. First, the Pact follows the
air forces and NSWP air defense fighters. These concept of evacuating to the rear those regimental
calculations are based upon the assumption that, dur- aircraft that require extensive repairs. This eliminates
ing the surge period, LRA aircraft would generate a the possibility of rapid turnaround provided by on-site
maximum of two sorties a day, and aircraft of the repairs and reduces the number of aircraft available
other forces, from three to five sorties a day. Subse- for regimental operations. Second, the growing sophis-
quently, the number of daily sorties would decline as a tication of the Pact aircraft requires increasing main-
result of aircraft attrition. As the sortie rate declined, tenance and service time. Recent reports indicate that
the expenditure rate would decline accordingly. the ratio of maintenance to flying time of newer
240. Total Pact air force consumption (not includ- aircraft is increasing. Servicing time, which includes
ing air-to-surface missiles) during a campaign of 12 refueling and rearming these advanced aircraft, is also
(lays would be about 40 percent of air ordnance stocks increasing because improvements of servicing facilities
calculated to be stored in the East Germany, Poland, have not kept pace with aircraft improvements.
and Czechoslovakia, and the three western military 243. In sum, we believe the older Frontal Aviation
districts. If there were no destruction of stocks, about aircraft could meet the projected three-sortie-per-day
215,000 metric tons of ammunition would remain, rate for an initial three-day period but probably would
sufficient to sustain air operations for an estimated be reduced to one sortie per day thereafter. The newer
additional 20 to 25 days. Air force consumption of aircraft, requiring more maintenance and service
POL for a campaign of 12 days would be about time, probably could not make more than two sorties
640,000 metric tons. Approximately 1.9 million tons per day during the surge period and one per day
would remain available for an additional 40 to 45 thereafter.
days."
241. Maintenance. For Pact air forces the goal of Naval Forces
the maintenance system in peacetime is to maintain 85 244. Just as the Pact's air and ground logistics would
percent of all aircraft assigned to a regiment in an be crucial to operations against NATO, naval logistics
operationally ready status. To attain this goal, the would also be key. to Pact naval operations in support
Soviets and their allies have established a maintenance of European ground and air campaigns. The success of
system involving a series of scheduled inspections and the Pact's initial naval operations would be dependent
servicings. Responsibility for this program rests with on the Soviets' ability to maximize the availability of
the regimental maintenance specialists of the Soviet combatants and timely deployment to key areas. In a
Aviation Engineering Services. These specialists, who protracted war, the success of sustained combat oper-
include engineers, mechanics, and. technicians, are ations would depend on the Soviet capabilities to
assigned to flight branches, squadron maintenance replenish and maintain units at sea.
units, and to the primary servicing element of the
regiment, the technical maintenance unit. Mainte- 245. The critical items of supply are munitions and
nance personnel probably have the technical compe- fuel. Assuming maximum readiness and deployment
tence to meet peacetime requirements but evidently of naval forces in their normal operating areas, we
are in short supply, thus requiring augmentation from believe the principal surface combatants supported by
the civilian labor pool. A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably not affect the outcome of a conflict of short about 30 to 40 days. Subsequently, fuel would be
--- required from reserves in home fleets or replenish-
"These estimates are based on the maximum numbers of aircraft ment rendezvous areas. Estimated patrol duration
available (excluding combat trainers) and thus represent a minimum before replenishment is at least 40 days for diesel
period for Pact sustained operations. Additional ammunition and submarines of medium range and 60 days for those ofP01. stocks located in the military districts west of the Urals, as well
as civilian PO, stocks in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslova- long range.
kia, would increase the available supplies for combat operations.
Factors such as a lower sortie rate, aircraft attrition, and aircraft 246. Of the 39 oilers in the three western fleets,
withhold missions would also contribute to a longer period of only six are considered modern underway replenish-
sustained operations. ment ships by Western standards. These six, plus six
11-69
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.