Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the outcome of a prolonged
of air-to-surface missiles. These quantities would sup- conflict by reducing the combat sortie sustainability
port a surge period of one day for Backfire, Badger, rate.
and Blinder aircraft of Long Range Aviation and a 242. Two other factors will have an effect on sortie
three-day surge period for Soviet and NSWP tactical rate, even in a short conflict. First, the Pact follows the
air forces and NSWP air defense fighters. These concept of evacuating to the rear those regimental
calculations are based upon the assumption that, dur- aircraft that require extensive repairs. This eliminates
ing the surge period, LRA aircraft would generate a the possibility of rapid turnaround provided by on-site
maximum of two sorties a day, and aircraft of the repairs and reduces the number of aircraft available
other forces, from three to five sorties a day. Subse- for regimental operations. Second, the growing sophis-
quently, the number of daily sorties would decline as a tication of the Pact aircraft requires increasing main-
result of aircraft attrition. As the sortie rate declined, tenance and service time. Recent reports indicate that
the expenditure rate would decline accordingly. the ratio of maintenance to flying time of newer
240. Total Pact air force consumption (not includ- aircraft is increasing. Servicing time, which includes
ing air-to-surface missiles) during a campaign of 12 refueling and rearming these advanced aircraft, is also
(lays would be about 40 percent of air ordnance stocks increasing because improvements of servicing facilities
calculated to be stored in the East Germany, Poland, have not kept pace with aircraft improvements.
and Czechoslovakia, and the three western military 243. In sum, we believe the older Frontal Aviation
districts. If there were no destruction of stocks, about aircraft could meet the projected three-sortie-per-day
215,000 metric tons of ammunition would remain, rate for an initial three-day period but probably would
sufficient to sustain air operations for an estimated be reduced to one sortie per day thereafter. The newer
additional 20 to 25 days. Air force consumption of aircraft, requiring more maintenance and service
POL for a campaign of 12 days would be about time, probably could not make more than two sorties
640,000 metric tons. Approximately 1.9 million tons per day during the surge period and one per day
would remain available for an additional 40 to 45 thereafter.
days."
241. Maintenance. For Pact air forces the goal of Naval Forces
the maintenance system in peacetime is to maintain 85 244. Just as the Pact's air and ground logistics would
percent of all aircraft assigned to a regiment in an be crucial to operations against NATO, naval logistics
operationally ready status. To attain this goal, the would also be key. to Pact naval operations in support
Soviets and their allies have established a maintenance of European ground and air campaigns. The success of
system involving a series of scheduled inspections and the Pact's initial naval operations would be dependent
servicings. Responsibility for this program rests with on the Soviets' ability to maximize the availability of
the regimental maintenance specialists of the Soviet combatants and timely deployment to key areas. In a
Aviation Engineering Services. These specialists, who protracted war, the success of sustained combat oper-
include engineers, mechanics, and. technicians, are ations would depend on the Soviet capabilities to
assigned to flight branches, squadron maintenance replenish and maintain units at sea.
units, and to the primary servicing element of the
regiment, the technical maintenance unit. Mainte- 245. The critical items of supply are munitions and
nance personnel probably have the technical compe- fuel. Assuming maximum readiness and deployment
tence to meet peacetime requirements but evidently of naval forces in their normal operating areas, we
are in short supply, thus requiring augmentation from believe the principal surface combatants supported by
the civilian labor pool. A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably not affect the outcome of a conflict of short about 30 to 40 days. Subsequently, fuel would be
--- required from reserves in home fleets or replenish-
"These estimates are based on the maximum numbers of aircraft ment rendezvous areas. Estimated patrol duration
available (excluding combat trainers) and thus represent a minimum before replenishment is at least 40 days for diesel
period for Pact sustained operations. Additional ammunition and submarines of medium range and 60 days for those ofP01. stocks located in the military districts west of the Urals, as well
as civilian PO, stocks in East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslova- long range.
kia, would increase the available supplies for combat operations.
Factors such as a lower sortie rate, aircraft attrition, and aircraft 246. Of the 39 oilers in the three western fleets,
withhold missions would also contribute to a longer period of only six are considered modern underway replenish-
sustained operations. ment ships by Western standards. These six, plus six
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