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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
training regiments requirements which are unique to air operations, such
as aviation POL; and the military district (within the
Replacement personnel USSR) or the front-level rear service organizations
would also be available from the large pool of reserv- supply common-use items. The front is responsible for
ists in the USSR. NSWP countries similarly have large storing and delivering common-use items to all mili-
reservist pools and well-organized mobilization tary units within its organization. It is also required to
systems. supplement the motor transport resources of an air
234. We believe that, rather than depend on stock- army.
piles of war reserve equipment to replace losses in the 237. Stockpiles. In addition to airfield stocks, there
early stages of a war, the Soviets would rely upon unit are stocks of POL, ammunition, and technical and
replacement by fully equipped units which exist in common supplies stored at centrally located depots
peacetime as low-strength or mobilization divisions. throughout the Warsaw Pact. Air units would normally
The large number of such units available are probably be expected to replenish their airfield stocks from
viewed by the Soviets as sufficient to sustain the forces these off-base depots. Air units usually draw their
until such time as production after M-day could build technical supplies from centrally located air force
up new equipment reserves. The Soviets have modest supply depots and draw their common supplies from
stockpiles of older equipment not in units in the USSR, centrally located supply depots under the operational
but our information on the serviceability and purpose control of front rear service elements. There are some
of this equipment is scant. The stockpiles include some air force depots which support air units with both
1,400 tanks, approximately 7,000 artillery pieces, some technical and common supplies.
8,500 various air defense artillery pieces, about 600 238. Pact air forces are calculated to have 290,600
armored personnel carriers, and miscellaneous equip- metric tons of ammunition, bombs, and rockets stock-
ment, all in the military districts west of the Urals. piled in the Central Region-East Germany, Czecho-
235. Production. Production factors and surge slovakia, and Poland-and an additional 130,000 tons
rates would not have a significant impact on the in the USSR west of the Urals." POL storage facilities
ratces wo anort avewar signifantopaTe lsthe associated with-Pact air forces have a calculated totaloutcome of a short war in Europe. The logistic of25mlin etctnsnsorgimdaey
capability of the Pact to support a protracted conflict of 2.5 million metric tons in storage immediately
would depend largely on whether production rates opposite the NATO Central Region: 1.3 million in the
could keep pace with expenditure and attrition rates. East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and 1.2
For the most critical supply category, ammunition, the million in the three western military districts of the
estimated monthly capacity of plants producing con USSR. This does not include a substantial amount of
ventional small arms, tank, and artillery ammunition POL stored in airfield facilities.
in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the 239.. Consumption. We calculate that, during a
USSR are shown in table 11-18. three-front operation lasting 12 days, Warsaw Pact air
Air Forces forces would expend approximately 143,000 tons of
236. Doctrine. Warsaw Pact air force logistic doc-
trine calls for the distribution of supplies to air units in
two ways: air force channels provide the logistics
Table II-18
Estimated Monthly Ammunition Production Capability of the USSR,
East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
January 1979
(metric tons)
M-Day M+30 M+60 M+90 M+120
Small arms, tank, and artillery 50,000 50,000 105,000 125,000 125,000
ammunition to to to to to
_ 60,000 60,000 110,000 130,00 130,000
11-68
lop ~L,,

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.