Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

training regiments requirements which are unique to air operations, such
as aviation POL; and the military district (within the
Replacement personnel USSR) or the front-level rear service organizations
would also be available from the large pool of reserv- supply common-use items. The front is responsible for
ists in the USSR. NSWP countries similarly have large storing and delivering common-use items to all mili-
reservist pools and well-organized mobilization tary units within its organization. It is also required to
systems. supplement the motor transport resources of an air
234. We believe that, rather than depend on stock- army.
piles of war reserve equipment to replace losses in the 237. Stockpiles. In addition to airfield stocks, there
early stages of a war, the Soviets would rely upon unit are stocks of POL, ammunition, and technical and
replacement by fully equipped units which exist in common supplies stored at centrally located depots
peacetime as low-strength or mobilization divisions. throughout the Warsaw Pact. Air units would normally
The large number of such units available are probably be expected to replenish their airfield stocks from
viewed by the Soviets as sufficient to sustain the forces these off-base depots. Air units usually draw their
until such time as production after M-day could build technical supplies from centrally located air force
up new equipment reserves. The Soviets have modest supply depots and draw their common supplies from
stockpiles of older equipment not in units in the USSR, centrally located supply depots under the operational
but our information on the serviceability and purpose control of front rear service elements. There are some
of this equipment is scant. The stockpiles include some air force depots which support air units with both
1,400 tanks, approximately 7,000 artillery pieces, some technical and common supplies.
8,500 various air defense artillery pieces, about 600 238. Pact air forces are calculated to have 290,600
armored personnel carriers, and miscellaneous equip- metric tons of ammunition, bombs, and rockets stock-
ment, all in the military districts west of the Urals. piled in the Central Region-East Germany, Czecho-
235. Production. Production factors and surge slovakia, and Poland-and an additional 130,000 tons
rates would not have a significant impact on the in the USSR west of the Urals." POL storage facilities
ratces wo anort avewar signifantopaTe lsthe associated with-Pact air forces have a calculated totaloutcome of a short war in Europe. The logistic of25mlin etctnsnsorgimdaey
capability of the Pact to support a protracted conflict of 2.5 million metric tons in storage immediately
would depend largely on whether production rates opposite the NATO Central Region: 1.3 million in the
could keep pace with expenditure and attrition rates. East Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia, and 1.2
For the most critical supply category, ammunition, the million in the three western military districts of the
estimated monthly capacity of plants producing con USSR. This does not include a substantial amount of
ventional small arms, tank, and artillery ammunition POL stored in airfield facilities.
in East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and the 239.. Consumption. We calculate that, during a
USSR are shown in table 11-18. three-front operation lasting 12 days, Warsaw Pact air
Air Forces forces would expend approximately 143,000 tons of
236. Doctrine. Warsaw Pact air force logistic doc-
trine calls for the distribution of supplies to air units in
two ways: air force channels provide the logistics
Table II-18
Estimated Monthly Ammunition Production Capability of the USSR,
East Germany, Poland, and Czechoslovakia
January 1979
(metric tons)
M-Day M+30 M+60 M+90 M+120
Small arms, tank, and artillery 50,000 50,000 105,000 125,000 125,000
ammunition to to to to to
_ 60,000 60,000 110,000 130,00 130,000
11-68
lop ~L,,