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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
that the Soviets could have these 29 divisions available tion that, during an operation, large numbers of active
for combat in Central Europe in 14 days. units will be deployed forward from rear echelons as
227. Maintenance. Pact maintenance support in unit replacements. Individual equipment replacement
wartime would be heavily concentrated in front and will be limited principally to out-of-action situations
army units. Although maintenance units exist at divi- for divisional units.
sion and below, they are austere by Western standards 231. Personnel Replacement and War Reserves.
and divisions would be dependent on army and front As with equipment, some in the Intelligence Commu-
organizations for much of their maintenance support. nity believe that unit replacement represents the
Field maintenance units at front and army levels are preferred replacement system within the Warsaw Pact
capable of making extensive repairs. Soviet drivers, for combat personnel."0 Based on initial strength, Pact
especially those assigned to armored vehicles, receive estimates of daily casualty rates during a conventional
mechanical training and mobile repair teams are offensive operation are about 1 percent for the front,
available to frontline units. While these resources 0.6 to 1.2 percent for an army, 3 to 6 percent for
would enable combat units to make minor repairs in committed divisions, and 10 to 16 percent for
wartime, the concentration of maintenance support
above division level would require that most heavily regiments.
damaged equipment be evacuated to the rear for 232. An alternative view" holds that the Soviets
repair. would use both an individual and a unit replacement
system, depending on the situation. The- holders of this
228. The Soviets plan their maintenance require- view believe that the Soviets would implement an
ments in wartime according to their assumed combat individual replacement system to feed ongoing re,,
attrition rates. These rates are calculated on a daily placements into Warsaw Pact units to replace relatively
basis for an army engaged in a conventional offensive small, steady attrition-type losses that would result
in which a breakthrough is achieved. Thereafter, the primarily from the use of conventional weapons. Unit
attrition rates are expected to fall sharply. According replacement would be used to supplement this system
to classified Soviet writings, the daily rates for an army in situations where large sudden losses, caused primar-
are approximately as follows: ily-by nuclear weapons, occurred or in instances where
Artillery and missile launchers......... 2-3 percent the individual replacement system proved unable to
Tanks .............................. ............. 12-15 percent replace cum ulative losses.
Armored combat vehicles ................ 6-8 percent
Motor transport vehicles ................ 5-6 percent
229. Within these projected combat losses, the So-.
viets believe 40 to 50 percent would require light
repair, 20 to 25 percent medium repair, and 10 to 15
percent major repair; 20 to 25 percent would be total
losses. The Soviets plan to make only light repairs in
combat at unit levels below division. Division main-
tenance facilities would make both light and medium
repairs but the bulk of the medium repair work would
be accomplished at front-level repair facilities. Major
repair work would not be done in the field during 233. A pool of men and equipment which would be
combat but would probably be assigned to rear repair immediately available for replacement purposes is
facilities in the USSR. present in training units in the Groups of Forces. In
230. Thus, for a tank army in the GSFG with the GSFG, there are approximately 500 tanks and
approximately 1,300 medium tanks, the Soviets would 7,000 men in one motorized rifle and five tank
expect to lose some 700 tanks in the initial four days of
a breakthrough operation. Of this number, they would $0 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency;
expect about 370 tanks to be repaired and eventually the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of
restored to service. We. are unable to judge whether State; and the Director, National Security Agency.
these Soviet estimates reflect a realistic picture of Pact "The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelli-
maintenance capabilities. The Pact concept for replac- gence Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
ing major items of equipment is based on the assump- Department of the Army.
1-67
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.