Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
that the Soviets could have these 29 divisions available tion that, during an operation, large numbers of active for combat in Central Europe in 14 days. units will be deployed forward from rear echelons as 227. Maintenance. Pact maintenance support in unit replacements. Individual equipment replacement wartime would be heavily concentrated in front and will be limited principally to out-of-action situations army units. Although maintenance units exist at divi- for divisional units. sion and below, they are austere by Western standards 231. Personnel Replacement and War Reserves. and divisions would be dependent on army and front As with equipment, some in the Intelligence Commu- organizations for much of their maintenance support. nity believe that unit replacement represents the Field maintenance units at front and army levels are preferred replacement system within the Warsaw Pact capable of making extensive repairs. Soviet drivers, for combat personnel."0 Based on initial strength, Pact especially those assigned to armored vehicles, receive estimates of daily casualty rates during a conventional mechanical training and mobile repair teams are offensive operation are about 1 percent for the front, available to frontline units. While these resources 0.6 to 1.2 percent for an army, 3 to 6 percent for would enable combat units to make minor repairs in committed divisions, and 10 to 16 percent for wartime, the concentration of maintenance support above division level would require that most heavily regiments. damaged equipment be evacuated to the rear for 232. An alternative view" holds that the Soviets repair. would use both an individual and a unit replacement system, depending on the situation. The- holders of this 228. The Soviets plan their maintenance require- view believe that the Soviets would implement an ments in wartime according to their assumed combat individual replacement system to feed ongoing re,, attrition rates. These rates are calculated on a daily placements into Warsaw Pact units to replace relatively basis for an army engaged in a conventional offensive small, steady attrition-type losses that would result in which a breakthrough is achieved. Thereafter, the primarily from the use of conventional weapons. Unit attrition rates are expected to fall sharply. According replacement would be used to supplement this system to classified Soviet writings, the daily rates for an army in situations where large sudden losses, caused primar- are approximately as follows: ily-by nuclear weapons, occurred or in instances where Artillery and missile launchers......... 2-3 percent the individual replacement system proved unable to Tanks .............................. ............. 12-15 percent replace cum ulative losses. Armored combat vehicles ................ 6-8 percent Motor transport vehicles ................ 5-6 percent 229. Within these projected combat losses, the So-. viets believe 40 to 50 percent would require light repair, 20 to 25 percent medium repair, and 10 to 15 percent major repair; 20 to 25 percent would be total losses. The Soviets plan to make only light repairs in combat at unit levels below division. Division main- tenance facilities would make both light and medium repairs but the bulk of the medium repair work would be accomplished at front-level repair facilities. Major repair work would not be done in the field during 233. A pool of men and equipment which would be combat but would probably be assigned to rear repair immediately available for replacement purposes is facilities in the USSR. present in training units in the Groups of Forces. In 230. Thus, for a tank army in the GSFG with the GSFG, there are approximately 500 tanks and approximately 1,300 medium tanks, the Soviets would 7,000 men in one motorized rifle and five tank expect to lose some 700 tanks in the initial four days of a breakthrough operation. Of this number, they would $0 The holders of this view are the Central Intelligence Agency; expect about 370 tanks to be repaired and eventually the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of restored to service. We. are unable to judge whether State; and the Director, National Security Agency. these Soviet estimates reflect a realistic picture of Pact "The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelli- maintenance capabilities. The Pact concept for replac- gence Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, ing major items of equipment is based on the assump- Department of the Army. 1-67 Tdir-Secraet
Not linked to a story yet.
FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.