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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 8 …I1-41 Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of Communication 11-41…
  • p. 9 …IV-25 Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27 Initial Air and Naval Operations…
  • p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1 ,'- - "''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea Warsaw…
  • p. 20 …An area in the Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom 10
  • p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
  • p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the amphibious force…
  • p. 23 …The Soviets would attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the Norwegian Sea…
  • p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
  • p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of 36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
  • p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
  • p. 54 …7 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle Norwegian divisionCategory I Sea Category II Category…
  • p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8 Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
  • p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea, January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
  • p. 72 …PO A ; re -t { - Black Sea Fleet ROMANI A -UGM (Dsevastopo - BUGRAFleet Caspian headquarters Black Sea…
  • p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
  • p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
  • p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
  • p. 77 lop et Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a Maximum system Payload (kg) Speed…
  • p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b Altitude (m) 18…
  • p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date remain submerged for…
  • p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
  • p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas. IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F bottom…
  • p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea Lines of Communication 142. In wartime, the Soviets…
  • p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
  • p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
  • p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted strength of…
  • p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
  • p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises, radius…
  • p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500) Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
  • p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
  • p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for probably…
  • p. 113 …The Soviets to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however, and instead…
  • p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize example, emergency action drills at sea are…
  • p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
  • p. 118 …Pact operations in the western and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
  • p. 121 …Barents Sea Maritime / T VD 49 shr rri s / Norwegian ICELAND '1 I ' Sea T''f…
  • p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
  • p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7 ~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea North Sea -? - ASNDT1 4... . NETHERLANDS 1…
  • p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would choose to attack with the two-front…
  • p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea- HAWK missile belt - Penetration corridor - - North Sea i/ POLAND - West Berlin…
  • p. 144 …This buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
  • p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
  • p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
  • p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be recognize that the…
  • p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would operations, and the speed with…
  • p. 149 …southwestern Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces Soviet divisions in Hungary…
  • p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into IV-26
  • p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea would be particularly critical to the Pact…
  • p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
  • p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern advantages…
  • p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to before the outbreak of hostilities…
  • p. 155 -T _P.3_re4' few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
  • p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect 103 and table…
  • p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian- reinforce airborne and…
  • p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
  • p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
  • p. 160 …1 Sea control N eMurmansk _ G+UK "r' Gap ''-1 (5Sea denial, ?" Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
  • p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our began, however, these forces probably would…
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mobilization. The holders of this view point out that and low-bed semitrailer, the standard tank transporter
the fact that Category II and III divisions and nondivi- of the Soviet ground forces. Six heavy lift regiments
sional motor transport units do not have all their cargo have been identified in the USSR opposite NATO:
vehicles or drivers in peacetime is not unique; all four in the western USSR and one each in the Moscow
lower category units rely on mobilization. Trucks used and Odessa Military Districts, These units are capable
in the civilian sector are similar and often identical to of transporting all the tanks of five or six tank
their military counterparts. Since the bulk of those divisions. They provide a significant capability for the
vehicles in the USSR designated for mobilization are strategic movement of armor by road. The concept,
organized into paramilitary units (avtokolonnas), there developed at least as early as 1967, was used in the
would be little difficulty in integrating this equipment 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Heavy lift regiments
into military units. Upon mobilization, reservist increase the alternatives available to Soviet planners,
drivers of these vehicles would be performing duties and would add flexibility and speed to any reinforce-
closely related to their civilian occupation and, in the ment of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.
case of paramilitary transport organizations, for the
same supervisors. Thus, the integration of these reserv- p24 . R
ists into motor transport units would be easier than for primary means of transportation during mobilization,
most other reservists, whose civilian occupations have for long-distance movements. The Pact rail network in
no corresponding military duties, The holders of this Central Europe is dense, totaling about 51,000 kilo-
view further point out that analyses of the perform- meters, and, conveniently for military operations, it
ance of Soviet motor transport conducted after the generally runs east to west. Its centralized control
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia do not support the facilitates responsiveness to military requirements.
conclusion that there were serious weaknesses in the The major through-routes connecting Central Europe
system. On the contrary, these analyses concluded that and the western USSR have a combined capacity of
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated about 500,000 metric tons per day in each direction. In
the adequacy of rear service elements to support large- contrast to the well-established network in Central
scale ground force deployments, and that vehicle Europe, the rail networks on the flanks are not nearly
reliability and maintenance appeared satisfactory. In as dense or well developed.
any event, the number of avtokolonnas has increased 225. The highway system in East Germany, Poland,
greatly since 1968 and currently numbers more than and Czechoslovakia exceeds 430,000 km, and major
400 in the USSR. Moreover, the quality of trucks routes have the capacity to handle nearly 120,000 tons
assigned has shown a substantial improvement over the per day. Movement of materiel to a distance less than
same period. The holders of this view agree that there 300 km probably would be made by road. For move-
have been some reports of vehicle breakdowns in truck ment over greater distances, both rail and road are
pools in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, likely to be used. Movement along the road and rail
but would not characterize these reports as wide- nets could be substantially reduced if refined petroleum
spread. Finally, the holders of this view point out that were moved by the pipeline of the Communist Euro-
the implication in paragraph 219 that the GSFG pean economic community (CEMA). Conversion of
would require commandeered or mobilized trucks is the pipeline from crude to refined products would
not supported by fact. They point out that since the take about one week; thereafter the system would be
simultaneous lift capability of the GSFG motor trans- capable of delivering 55,000 tons of petroleum daily to
port brigade exceeds anticipated daily requirements, both East Germany and Czechoslovakia. There is some
the lift capability of this organization in normal evidence that Pact logistic planners intend to convert
resupply operations would be adequate to compensate the pipeline in time of war, and it appears to be a
for normal wartime attrition feasible contingency measure to supplement existing
222. The Soviets are increasing the lift capabilities petroleum supply methods.
of their motor transport units by introducing a new
truck, the KamAZ-5320. This vehicle, with an estimated 226. Pact movement plans are not available to us
trck te amZ-32.hi ehcl, it a etiatd but, according to a study by the Defense Intelligence
capacity of 8 metric tons, has a 60-percent greater lift
capacity than the Ural-375, which it is augmenting in Agency, 29 divisons, plus support and supplies, could
some motor transport units in the forward area. be moved over the rail and highway system from the
western USSR to Central Europe in some 11 to 14
223. The Soviets also have developed a number of days. These findings are consistent with the judgment
heavy lift regiments using the MAZ-537 prime mover elsewhere in this Estimate (chapter IV, paragraph 21)
I1-66
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.