Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

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mobilization. The holders of this view point out that and low-bed semitrailer, the standard tank transporter
the fact that Category II and III divisions and nondivi- of the Soviet ground forces. Six heavy lift regiments
sional motor transport units do not have all their cargo have been identified in the USSR opposite NATO:
vehicles or drivers in peacetime is not unique; all four in the western USSR and one each in the Moscow
lower category units rely on mobilization. Trucks used and Odessa Military Districts, These units are capable
in the civilian sector are similar and often identical to of transporting all the tanks of five or six tank
their military counterparts. Since the bulk of those divisions. They provide a significant capability for the
vehicles in the USSR designated for mobilization are strategic movement of armor by road. The concept,
organized into paramilitary units (avtokolonnas), there developed at least as early as 1967, was used in the
would be little difficulty in integrating this equipment 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Heavy lift regiments
into military units. Upon mobilization, reservist increase the alternatives available to Soviet planners,
drivers of these vehicles would be performing duties and would add flexibility and speed to any reinforce-
closely related to their civilian occupation and, in the ment of Soviet forces in Eastern Europe.
case of paramilitary transport organizations, for the
same supervisors. Thus, the integration of these reserv- p24 . R
ists into motor transport units would be easier than for primary means of transportation during mobilization,
most other reservists, whose civilian occupations have for long-distance movements. The Pact rail network in
no corresponding military duties, The holders of this Central Europe is dense, totaling about 51,000 kilo-
view further point out that analyses of the perform- meters, and, conveniently for military operations, it
ance of Soviet motor transport conducted after the generally runs east to west. Its centralized control
1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia do not support the facilitates responsiveness to military requirements.
conclusion that there were serious weaknesses in the The major through-routes connecting Central Europe
system. On the contrary, these analyses concluded that and the western USSR have a combined capacity of
the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia demonstrated about 500,000 metric tons per day in each direction. In
the adequacy of rear service elements to support large- contrast to the well-established network in Central
scale ground force deployments, and that vehicle Europe, the rail networks on the flanks are not nearly
reliability and maintenance appeared satisfactory. In as dense or well developed.
any event, the number of avtokolonnas has increased 225. The highway system in East Germany, Poland,
greatly since 1968 and currently numbers more than and Czechoslovakia exceeds 430,000 km, and major
400 in the USSR. Moreover, the quality of trucks routes have the capacity to handle nearly 120,000 tons
assigned has shown a substantial improvement over the per day. Movement of materiel to a distance less than
same period. The holders of this view agree that there 300 km probably would be made by road. For move-
have been some reports of vehicle breakdowns in truck ment over greater distances, both rail and road are
pools in East Germany, Czechoslovakia, and Poland, likely to be used. Movement along the road and rail
but would not characterize these reports as wide- nets could be substantially reduced if refined petroleum
spread. Finally, the holders of this view point out that were moved by the pipeline of the Communist Euro-
the implication in paragraph 219 that the GSFG pean economic community (CEMA). Conversion of
would require commandeered or mobilized trucks is the pipeline from crude to refined products would
not supported by fact. They point out that since the take about one week; thereafter the system would be
simultaneous lift capability of the GSFG motor trans- capable of delivering 55,000 tons of petroleum daily to
port brigade exceeds anticipated daily requirements, both East Germany and Czechoslovakia. There is some
the lift capability of this organization in normal evidence that Pact logistic planners intend to convert
resupply operations would be adequate to compensate the pipeline in time of war, and it appears to be a
for normal wartime attrition feasible contingency measure to supplement existing
222. The Soviets are increasing the lift capabilities petroleum supply methods.
of their motor transport units by introducing a new
truck, the KamAZ-5320. This vehicle, with an estimated 226. Pact movement plans are not available to us
trck te amZ-32.hi ehcl, it a etiatd but, according to a study by the Defense Intelligence
capacity of 8 metric tons, has a 60-percent greater lift
capacity than the Ural-375, which it is augmenting in Agency, 29 divisons, plus support and supplies, could
some motor transport units in the forward area. be moved over the rail and highway system from the
western USSR to Central Europe in some 11 to 14
223. The Soviets also have developed a number of days. These findings are consistent with the judgment
heavy lift regiments using the MAZ-537 prime mover elsewhere in this Estimate (chapter IV, paragraph 21)
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