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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
would probably sustain a force of this size. for a period Cargo and POL Lift Capacities Figure 11-32
up to three months. of Soviet Divisions,
218. Transportationand Movement. In a war of 1969 and 1979
short duration and high intensity the ability to sustain
the momentum of an advance is determined not only
by the availability of stocks but equally by the capabil- Cargo Capacity
ity to move supplies, materiel, and personnel forward. Tons
The Soviets estimate that in the course of a front 10,000
operation, as much as 350,000 tons of supplies would
be delivered to the front, or an average of about 8,000
30,000 tons daily. Deliveries from front to committed Motorized
armies would amount to about 20,000 tons daily- Rifle
wo6,ot Divisions Tank
219. Soviet plans call for 16,000 of the 20,000 Divisions
metric tons to be moved by front motor transport. The 4 000
numbers of trucks available in the Group of Soviet Tr6k.;
Forces in Germany (GSFG) has been substantially
increased in recent years (see figure II-32) and we 2,000
estimate that, by itself, the GSFG motor transport
brigade could lift about 18,000 tons simultaneously. 0 1969 1979
This estimate, however, does not take into account
daily losses due to combat attrition, mechanical and POL Capacity
human failures, and accidents that would occur in a Thousand Liters
combat situation. Presumably, the GSFG could ac- 2,000
quire additional trucks in an emergency, either by
commandeering East German civilian trucks or by
bringing mobilized civilian trucks from the USSR. 1,500 -
220. NSWP forces and Soviet forces in the USSR M
Motorized
would require large-scale augmentation with civilian 1,000 Rifle Tank
trucks in wartime. Category II and III divisions and Divisions Divisions
army- and front-level motor transport units would get
most of their trucks this way. All Warsaw Pact 5ra0 er_
countries have plans to call up civilian trucks and Tu-
drivers on a large scale to reach war footing. Consider-
able preparations for this are made in peacetime, 0
including prior designation of trucks to be mobilized 1969 1979
and military inspections for serviceability. The Soviets
evidently have the most elaborate system and have
established paramilitar-y truck units in civilian motor 577621 1.79 CIA
transport establishments to meet their highest priority
truck requirements in wartime. Partial tests of the We judge, however,
Warsaw Pact truck callup system are conducted in that despite weaknesses in the transport system, the
peacetime. Pact would be able to assemble sufficient motor
transport to meet its wartime requirements.
221. According to an alternate view,29 paragraph
220 implies erroneously that there are serious weak-
nesses in the Pact's wartime motor transport system
which are due primarily to the system's reliance on
29The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence,
Department of the Army.
11-65
-Top-Sel

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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.