Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Headquarters”14 pages
would probably sustain a force of this size. for a period Cargo and POL Lift Capacities Figure 11-32 up to three months. of Soviet Divisions, 218. Transportationand Movement. In a war of 1969 and 1979 short duration and high intensity the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability of stocks but equally by the capabil- Cargo Capacity ity to move supplies, materiel, and personnel forward. Tons The Soviets estimate that in the course of a front 10,000 operation, as much as 350,000 tons of supplies would be delivered to the front, or an average of about 8,000 30,000 tons daily. Deliveries from front to committed Motorized armies would amount to about 20,000 tons daily- Rifle wo6,ot Divisions Tank 219. Soviet plans call for 16,000 of the 20,000 Divisions metric tons to be moved by front motor transport. The 4 000 numbers of trucks available in the Group of Soviet Tr6k.; Forces in Germany (GSFG) has been substantially increased in recent years (see figure II-32) and we 2,000 estimate that, by itself, the GSFG motor transport brigade could lift about 18,000 tons simultaneously. 0 1969 1979 This estimate, however, does not take into account daily losses due to combat attrition, mechanical and POL Capacity human failures, and accidents that would occur in a Thousand Liters combat situation. Presumably, the GSFG could ac- 2,000 quire additional trucks in an emergency, either by commandeering East German civilian trucks or by bringing mobilized civilian trucks from the USSR. 1,500 - 220. NSWP forces and Soviet forces in the USSR M Motorized would require large-scale augmentation with civilian 1,000 Rifle Tank trucks in wartime. Category II and III divisions and Divisions Divisions army- and front-level motor transport units would get most of their trucks this way. All Warsaw Pact 5ra0 er_ countries have plans to call up civilian trucks and Tu- drivers on a large scale to reach war footing. Consider- able preparations for this are made in peacetime, 0 including prior designation of trucks to be mobilized 1969 1979 and military inspections for serviceability. The Soviets evidently have the most elaborate system and have established paramilitar-y truck units in civilian motor 577621 1.79 CIA transport establishments to meet their highest priority truck requirements in wartime. Partial tests of the We judge, however, Warsaw Pact truck callup system are conducted in that despite weaknesses in the transport system, the peacetime. Pact would be able to assemble sufficient motor transport to meet its wartime requirements. 221. According to an alternate view,29 paragraph 220 implies erroneously that there are serious weak- nesses in the Pact's wartime motor transport system which are due primarily to the system's reliance on 29The holders of this view are the Director, Defense Intelli- gence Agency, and the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of the Army. 11-65 -Top-Sel
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.