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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Table II-16 NATO maintains a cohesive defense. Ammunition
expenditures would probably be greater than in a
Calculations of Warsaw Pact Ammunition Stocks successful Warsaw Pact attack, at least initially, and
Based on Depot Capacities could surge to 50,000 tons a day during periods of
January 1979 high-intensity combat or reach a daily average of
Ammunition 35,000 to 40,000 tons over a more prolonged period.
(rnetric tons) At this daily average rate of expenditure, and assum-
Czechoslovakia 420,000 ing no destruction of stocks, we calculate that there
East Germany ........ 435,000 would be sufficient ammunition in the Central Region
Poland 460,000 and the three western military districts of the USSR to
Total ...................................... 1,315,000 sustain Pact forces for 40 to 50 days. It should be noted
Baltic Military District .. 100,000 that this period could be lengthened considerably by
Belorussian Military District ....................... 140,000 drawing ammunition from the strategic reserve stocks
Carpathian Military District ....................... 115000 in the USSR, particularly those located west of the
Total 355,000 Urals. Portions of these stocks, which total approxi-
Hungary 220,000 mately 2.2 million tons, could be moved forward
Bulgaria 130,000 either in a buildup phase prior to the initiation of
Romania 300,000 hostilities or during a subsequent reinforcement phase
Total ........ ... .... 650,000 after hostilities had begun.
Opposite NATO Flanks a ... . ......... 810,000 216. POL. Our calculations of the levels of Pact
Strategic eserves b (West of Urals) . . 2,200,000 POL stocks for military use are less critical to judg-
a Includes stocks in the Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus, ments of Pact sustainability than ammunition because
and Transcaucasus Military Districts the margin of supply over, requirements appears to be
b Includes stocks in the Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military greater than that for ammunition, and POL produc-
Districts.
,;Ec ... tion more closely approaches projected consumption.
In addition, the use of supplemental civilian POL
stocks would almost double available military supplies.
213. The Soviets estimate that a front would re- Calculated Pact POL stocks opposite Central Europe,
quire 120,000 to 150,000 metric tons of ammunition in based on an assumed 80 percent of estimated capacity,
a nonnuclear offensive operation lasting 12 to 15 are shown in table II-17.
days."a These amounts are intended to allow not only
for expenditures, but also for' reestablishing the -217. On the basis of Soviet POL consumption fac-
required reserves and replacing combat losses in prep- tors, we have calculated that five fronts opposite
aration for subsequent operations. In such a 12- to 15- Central Europe consisting of 87 divisions would con-
day operation, for example, ammunition requirements sume approximately 400,000 tons of POL in an offen-
for a three-front operation against NATO's Central sive operation lasting 12 to 15 days, well below the
Region would range from 360,000 to 450,000 tons. estimate of available supplies. Calculated POL stocks
214. Calculated ammunition stocks in the forward
area exceed the requirements for a single three-front
operation and thus would support subsequent oper- Calculations of Warsaw Pact POL Stocks Opposite
ations. The stocks in the three western military dis- Central Europe Based on Depot Capacities
tricts are probably sufficient to support the reinforcing January 1979
effort of two second-echelon fronts, consisting of as __- -
many as 29 divisions. Additional ammunition for POL
operations against NATO could be made available (netric tons)
from strategic reserves located west of the Ural Czechoslovakia ........... .................... 426,000
Mountains. East Germany ................. ....... .......... 555,000
Poland ... . . .............. ............ :..... 5 14,000
215. There is little information on W arsaw Pact Total . ... .................... ...... 1,495,000
ammunition estimates for a protracted conflict in Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military
w hich the Pact fails to m ake a breakthrough and Districts ..................-. ......................................... 2,200,000
All tonnages in this section are in metric tons.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.