“Sea”60+ pages
- p. 8 …I1-41
Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO's Sea Lines of
Communication 11-41…
- p. 9 …IV-25
Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea IV-27
Initial Air and Naval Operations…
- p. 16 …European NATO and the Warsaw Pact Figure 1
,'-
-
"''i 'Fr,~'""' NNA TO countries Benes Sea
Warsaw…
- p. 20 …An area in the
Norwegian Sea north of the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom
10
- p. 21 …The forces of the Baltic and Black
Sea Combined Fleets initially would be under the control…
- p. 22 …To assist in the achievement of air and sea superiority and to protect the
amphibious force…
- p. 23 …The Soviets would
attempt to neutralize Western SSBNs near their bases and in the
Norwegian Sea…
- p. 28 …Extent, Emphasis, and Timing of the Soviet Interdiction
Campaign Against NATO Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC…
- p. 30 …Likely Effectiveness of Pact Operations To Achieve Air
Superiority and Sea Control in the Baltic Sea…
- p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before
Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
- p. 42 …At sea the establishment and maintenance of
36. The Soviets recognize the formidable strength Soviet naval…
- p. 50 …not include airborne divisions or the Polish Sea Landing
division-level air defense weapons. The SA…
- p. 54 …7
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP
NorweqianA'Motr iisio rifle
Norwegian divisionCategory I
Sea Category II
Category…
- p. 60 Peacetime Location of Warsaw Pact Air Forces Opposite NATO Figure 1-8
Barents Sea Soviet NSWP…
- p. 71 …For operations in the Mediterranean Sea,
January 1979 the Black Sea Fleet furnishes most of the…
- p. 72 …PO A
; re
-t {
- Black Sea Fleet
ROMANI A
-UGM (Dsevastopo -
BUGRAFleet Caspian
headquarters Black Sea…
- p. 73 …If the Soviets were not concerned with covert
deployment of their ships to sea, they could…
- p. 74 …number of ships able to put to sea on short have some 30 principal surface combatants…
- p. 75 …The wartime missions of the Warsaw Pact's
general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea…
- p. 77 lop et
Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21a
Maximum system
Payload (kg) Speed…
- p. 78 Nominal Flight Profiles of Selected Soviet Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles Figure II-21b
Altitude (m)
18…
- p. 79 …but can into the Baltic and Black Sea Fleet air forces to date
remain submerged for…
- p. 80 …In the antiship role, wartime operational con- against ships at sea. The Fitters, however, all of…
- p. 83 …Pact fleets in the Baltic and Black Seas.
IL-38 May TU-142 Bear F
bottom…
- p. 84 …Capabilities for Exercising Sea Denial in NATO Sea
Lines of Communication
142. In wartime, the Soviets…
- p. 85 …of a conflict when NATO
Baltic Sea, the Black Sea, and much of the Norwegian would…
- p. 86 Table II-9 Northern Fleet submarine bases and the North
Atlantic sea lanes. They point out…
- p. 87 …In the Black Sea area, the combined Nuclear weapons allocations that we have noted
strength of…
- p. 95 …with either land- or sea-based missile forces. The LRA
H-II SSBN . 4/12 intermediate…
- p. 96 …This latest Soviet bomber has a combat particularly naval task forces at sea During exercises,
radius…
- p. 100 …Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea…
- p. 102 …bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple…
- p. 112 …A shortage of technicians would oilers from their home fleets could operate at sea for
probably…
- p. 113 …The Soviets
to sustain operations at sea. rarely have been observed practicing this, however,
and instead…
- p. 114 …For naval and civilian, probably would seek to minimize
example, emergency action drills at sea are…
- p. 115 …developed to permit the Baltic and Black Sea Fleets to
foreseeable future, of marginal value be…
- p. 118 …Pact operations in the western
and sea areas, including islands (archipelagos), Baltic Sea also would be…
- p. 121 …Barents Sea
Maritime /
T VD 49 shr rri s /
Norwegian
ICELAND '1 I '
Sea T''f…
- p. 122 …The Combined Black Sea Fleet would
be formed from the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and the…
- p. 127 …t ,,D ES MA ! R K y 7
~ ~ §.~.Baltic 50ea
North Sea -?
- ASNDT1 4... .
NETHERLANDS
1…
- p. 131 …units and with additional naval units at sea-would
choose to attack with the two-front…
- p. 139 …4 NATO airbases Balte sea-
HAWK missile belt -
Penetration corridor - -
North Sea
i/
POLAND
- West Berlin…
- p. 144 …This
buffer for Pact territory, and defend Pact sea lines of would require effective coordination of…
- p. 145 …b The soviet Baltic Sea Fleet. Not included are minor surface combatants or 10 reserve ships…
- p. 146 …The Pact clearly is aware that the success of its
infantry regiment, the Polish sea landing…
- p. 147 …Pact planners also of ships assigned to protect Baltic sea lines would be
recognize that the…
- p. 148 …these air naval forces from the Black Sea. It also would
operations, and the speed with…
- p. 149 …southwestern
Brigrades .........-- 9e - - littoral of the Black Sea. Soviet surface naval forces
Soviet divisions in Hungary…
- p. 150 …and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there into
IV-26
- p. 151 …Pact air and sea superiority in the Black Sea
would be particularly critical to the Pact…
- p. 152 …the initialattacks by Soviet ships and submarines of
bThe Black Sea Fleet and the Mediterranean Squadron…
- p. 153 …The Soviets no doubt realize, however, that the Sea Fleet, although reinforcement from the Northern
advantages…
- p. 154 …be reinforced cally available in the Black Sea Fleet, seven to
before the outbreak of hostilities…
- p. 155 -T _P.3_re4'
few, if any, large combatants from the Black Sea the Straits as…
- p. 156 …See paragraphs 102 and forces in the Norwegian Sea. Initially, we could expect
103 and table…
- p. 157 …Sealifted ground forces could gian Sea. If the Soviets chose to avoid Norwegian-
reinforce airborne and…
- p. 158 …The Soviets have about 130 operational cruise
Barents Seas and their approaches apparently consist missile and…
- p. 159 …submarines normally deployed to the Mediterranean Sea. 169. Another view "1holds that, in a typical initial…
- p. 160 …1 Sea control
N eMurmansk
_ G+UK "r'
Gap ''-1
(5Sea denial, ?"
Holy locit tRosyth Moscow…
- p. 161 …Once hostilities cover the approaches to the Norwegian Sea. Our
began, however, these forces probably would…
Table II-16 NATO maintains a cohesive defense. Ammunition
expenditures would probably be greater than in a
Calculations of Warsaw Pact Ammunition Stocks successful Warsaw Pact attack, at least initially, and
Based on Depot Capacities could surge to 50,000 tons a day during periods of
January 1979 high-intensity combat or reach a daily average of
Ammunition 35,000 to 40,000 tons over a more prolonged period.
(rnetric tons) At this daily average rate of expenditure, and assum-
Czechoslovakia 420,000 ing no destruction of stocks, we calculate that there
East Germany ........ 435,000 would be sufficient ammunition in the Central Region
Poland 460,000 and the three western military districts of the USSR to
Total ...................................... 1,315,000 sustain Pact forces for 40 to 50 days. It should be noted
Baltic Military District .. 100,000 that this period could be lengthened considerably by
Belorussian Military District ....................... 140,000 drawing ammunition from the strategic reserve stocks
Carpathian Military District ....................... 115000 in the USSR, particularly those located west of the
Total 355,000 Urals. Portions of these stocks, which total approxi-
Hungary 220,000 mately 2.2 million tons, could be moved forward
Bulgaria 130,000 either in a buildup phase prior to the initiation of
Romania 300,000 hostilities or during a subsequent reinforcement phase
Total ........ ... .... 650,000 after hostilities had begun.
Opposite NATO Flanks a ... . ......... 810,000 216. POL. Our calculations of the levels of Pact
Strategic eserves b (West of Urals) . . 2,200,000 POL stocks for military use are less critical to judg-
a Includes stocks in the Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus, ments of Pact sustainability than ammunition because
and Transcaucasus Military Districts the margin of supply over, requirements appears to be
b Includes stocks in the Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military greater than that for ammunition, and POL produc-
Districts.
,;Ec ... tion more closely approaches projected consumption.
In addition, the use of supplemental civilian POL
stocks would almost double available military supplies.
213. The Soviets estimate that a front would re- Calculated Pact POL stocks opposite Central Europe,
quire 120,000 to 150,000 metric tons of ammunition in based on an assumed 80 percent of estimated capacity,
a nonnuclear offensive operation lasting 12 to 15 are shown in table II-17.
days."a These amounts are intended to allow not only
for expenditures, but also for' reestablishing the -217. On the basis of Soviet POL consumption fac-
required reserves and replacing combat losses in prep- tors, we have calculated that five fronts opposite
aration for subsequent operations. In such a 12- to 15- Central Europe consisting of 87 divisions would con-
day operation, for example, ammunition requirements sume approximately 400,000 tons of POL in an offen-
for a three-front operation against NATO's Central sive operation lasting 12 to 15 days, well below the
Region would range from 360,000 to 450,000 tons. estimate of available supplies. Calculated POL stocks
214. Calculated ammunition stocks in the forward
area exceed the requirements for a single three-front
operation and thus would support subsequent oper- Calculations of Warsaw Pact POL Stocks Opposite
ations. The stocks in the three western military dis- Central Europe Based on Depot Capacities
tricts are probably sufficient to support the reinforcing January 1979
effort of two second-echelon fronts, consisting of as __- -
many as 29 divisions. Additional ammunition for POL
operations against NATO could be made available (netric tons)
from strategic reserves located west of the Ural Czechoslovakia ........... .................... 426,000
Mountains. East Germany ................. ....... .......... 555,000
Poland ... . . .............. ............ :..... 5 14,000
215. There is little information on W arsaw Pact Total . ... .................... ...... 1,495,000
ammunition estimates for a protracted conflict in Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military
w hich the Pact fails to m ake a breakthrough and Districts ..................-. ......................................... 2,200,000
All tonnages in this section are in metric tons.
11-64
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