Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Table II-16 NATO maintains a cohesive defense. Ammunition
expenditures would probably be greater than in a
Calculations of Warsaw Pact Ammunition Stocks successful Warsaw Pact attack, at least initially, and
Based on Depot Capacities could surge to 50,000 tons a day during periods of
January 1979 high-intensity combat or reach a daily average of
Ammunition 35,000 to 40,000 tons over a more prolonged period.
(rnetric tons) At this daily average rate of expenditure, and assum-
Czechoslovakia 420,000 ing no destruction of stocks, we calculate that there
East Germany ........ 435,000 would be sufficient ammunition in the Central Region
Poland 460,000 and the three western military districts of the USSR to
Total ...................................... 1,315,000 sustain Pact forces for 40 to 50 days. It should be noted
Baltic Military District .. 100,000 that this period could be lengthened considerably by
Belorussian Military District ....................... 140,000 drawing ammunition from the strategic reserve stocks
Carpathian Military District ....................... 115000 in the USSR, particularly those located west of the
Total 355,000 Urals. Portions of these stocks, which total approxi-
Hungary 220,000 mately 2.2 million tons, could be moved forward
Bulgaria 130,000 either in a buildup phase prior to the initiation of
Romania 300,000 hostilities or during a subsequent reinforcement phase
Total ........ ... .... 650,000 after hostilities had begun.
Opposite NATO Flanks a ... . ......... 810,000 216. POL. Our calculations of the levels of Pact
Strategic eserves b (West of Urals) . . 2,200,000 POL stocks for military use are less critical to judg-
a Includes stocks in the Leningrad, Odessa, Kiev, North Caucasus, ments of Pact sustainability than ammunition because
and Transcaucasus Military Districts the margin of supply over, requirements appears to be
b Includes stocks in the Moscow, Ural, and Volga Military greater than that for ammunition, and POL produc-
Districts.
,;Ec ... tion more closely approaches projected consumption.
In addition, the use of supplemental civilian POL
stocks would almost double available military supplies.
213. The Soviets estimate that a front would re- Calculated Pact POL stocks opposite Central Europe,
quire 120,000 to 150,000 metric tons of ammunition in based on an assumed 80 percent of estimated capacity,
a nonnuclear offensive operation lasting 12 to 15 are shown in table II-17.
days."a These amounts are intended to allow not only
for expenditures, but also for' reestablishing the -217. On the basis of Soviet POL consumption fac-
required reserves and replacing combat losses in prep- tors, we have calculated that five fronts opposite
aration for subsequent operations. In such a 12- to 15- Central Europe consisting of 87 divisions would con-
day operation, for example, ammunition requirements sume approximately 400,000 tons of POL in an offen-
for a three-front operation against NATO's Central sive operation lasting 12 to 15 days, well below the
Region would range from 360,000 to 450,000 tons. estimate of available supplies. Calculated POL stocks
214. Calculated ammunition stocks in the forward
area exceed the requirements for a single three-front
operation and thus would support subsequent oper- Calculations of Warsaw Pact POL Stocks Opposite
ations. The stocks in the three western military dis- Central Europe Based on Depot Capacities
tricts are probably sufficient to support the reinforcing January 1979
effort of two second-echelon fronts, consisting of as __- -
many as 29 divisions. Additional ammunition for POL
operations against NATO could be made available (netric tons)
from strategic reserves located west of the Ural Czechoslovakia ........... .................... 426,000
Mountains. East Germany ................. ....... .......... 555,000
Poland ... . . .............. ............ :..... 5 14,000
215. There is little information on W arsaw Pact Total . ... .................... ...... 1,495,000
ammunition estimates for a protracted conflict in Baltic, Belorussian, and Carpathian Military
w hich the Pact fails to m ake a breakthrough and Districts ..................-. ......................................... 2,200,000
All tonnages in this section are in metric tons.
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