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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

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“Mission Control”29 pages

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
technology of the 1950s and the early 1960s. More this regard dates from the early 1970s. We have no
modern equipment first appeared in the early 1970s, way to judge the soundness of these Pact planning
but representative models of this more advanced factors in a future war as they relate to the attrition
equipment are only now appearing in the Pact, pri- rates for equipment and the consumption rates of
marily in Soviet units. Several types of new equipment expendables such as ammunition.
will not be deployed fully until the mid-1980s.
Our estimates of the levels of supplies are based
on calculations of the capacities of identified storage
facilities, adjusted to take loading factors into account.
Ground Forces
210. Doctrine. Pact logistic doctrine, based almost
exclusively on Soviet principles, specifies stock levels
to be maintained at each echelon. (See table II-15.)
The adequacy of supplies for a given period of time
would depend on the intensity and duration of combat
as well as Pact capabilities to begin replenishment.
211. Pact logistic doctrine specifies that additional
stocks are to be kept in the theater and in the national
reserve to supply the fronts. In particular, responsi-
bility for ensuring the flow of these supplies in
wartime is assigned to the commander of the higher
echelon from or through which they are to flow. In all
cases of supply movement, ammunition has priority
because it is critical to combat.
212. Ammunition Stocks. We believe ammunition
stocks are maintained at the various echelons within
the Pact as shown in table II-15. Some 600 ground
force ammunition depots have been identified in
Eastern Europe and in the USSR west of the Urals. We
have calculated Pact ground force ammunition stocks
in these depots
G. Warsaw Pact Logistics Table II-15
209. Warsaw Pact exercises, classified writings, and
other evidence indicate that the Pact is planning Days of Supply for Warsaw Pact Ground Force
logistic support for a series of short campaigns of high Echelons
intensity, involving the rapid achievement of a break- Division 3-5 days
through and advance to strategic objectives in the Army ........................... 2 days
NATO rear. Warsaw Pact logistic planning factors are Front Forward .. 4 days
evidently based on Soviet World War II experience, Front Rear.10 days
and updated in accordance with changes in tactics, Total 19-21 days
force structure, and equipment. Our information in
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.