Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Indian Air Force”5 pages
technology of the 1950s and the early 1960s. More this regard dates from the early 1970s. We have no modern equipment first appeared in the early 1970s, way to judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in a future war as they relate to the attrition equipment are only now appearing in the Pact, pri- rates for equipment and the consumption rates of marily in Soviet units. Several types of new equipment expendables such as ammunition. will not be deployed fully until the mid-1980s. Our estimates of the levels of supplies are based on calculations of the capacities of identified storage facilities, adjusted to take loading factors into account. Ground Forces 210. Doctrine. Pact logistic doctrine, based almost exclusively on Soviet principles, specifies stock levels to be maintained at each echelon. (See table II-15.) The adequacy of supplies for a given period of time would depend on the intensity and duration of combat as well as Pact capabilities to begin replenishment. 211. Pact logistic doctrine specifies that additional stocks are to be kept in the theater and in the national reserve to supply the fronts. In particular, responsi- bility for ensuring the flow of these supplies in wartime is assigned to the commander of the higher echelon from or through which they are to flow. In all cases of supply movement, ammunition has priority because it is critical to combat. 212. Ammunition Stocks. We believe ammunition stocks are maintained at the various echelons within the Pact as shown in table II-15. Some 600 ground force ammunition depots have been identified in Eastern Europe and in the USSR west of the Urals. We have calculated Pact ground force ammunition stocks in these depots G. Warsaw Pact Logistics Table II-15 209. Warsaw Pact exercises, classified writings, and other evidence indicate that the Pact is planning Days of Supply for Warsaw Pact Ground Force logistic support for a series of short campaigns of high Echelons intensity, involving the rapid achievement of a break- Division 3-5 days through and advance to strategic objectives in the Army ........................... 2 days NATO rear. Warsaw Pact logistic planning factors are Front Forward .. 4 days evidently based on Soviet World War II experience, Front Rear.10 days and updated in accordance with changes in tactics, Total 19-21 days force structure, and equipment. Our information in 11-63
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.