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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 114 …recently halted Soviet air operations from Conakry. These developments will obviously force the 257. Many officers…
  • p. 115 …order to keep other in establishing effective air cover over supporting lines units operational. of communication…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets could elect to provide combat forces scale commitment of manpower and materiel which to…
  • p. 187 …This force is occasionally aug- forces could not be safely transported by sea or air to…
  • p. 188 …a war, but they couldsome naval and air force weapons (including a few recently introduced Flogger…
technology of the 1950s and the early 1960s. More this regard dates from the early 1970s. We have no
modern equipment first appeared in the early 1970s, way to judge the soundness of these Pact planning
but representative models of this more advanced factors in a future war as they relate to the attrition
equipment are only now appearing in the Pact, pri- rates for equipment and the consumption rates of
marily in Soviet units. Several types of new equipment expendables such as ammunition.
will not be deployed fully until the mid-1980s.
Our estimates of the levels of supplies are based
on calculations of the capacities of identified storage
facilities, adjusted to take loading factors into account.
Ground Forces
210. Doctrine. Pact logistic doctrine, based almost
exclusively on Soviet principles, specifies stock levels
to be maintained at each echelon. (See table II-15.)
The adequacy of supplies for a given period of time
would depend on the intensity and duration of combat
as well as Pact capabilities to begin replenishment.
211. Pact logistic doctrine specifies that additional
stocks are to be kept in the theater and in the national
reserve to supply the fronts. In particular, responsi-
bility for ensuring the flow of these supplies in
wartime is assigned to the commander of the higher
echelon from or through which they are to flow. In all
cases of supply movement, ammunition has priority
because it is critical to combat.
212. Ammunition Stocks. We believe ammunition
stocks are maintained at the various echelons within
the Pact as shown in table II-15. Some 600 ground
force ammunition depots have been identified in
Eastern Europe and in the USSR west of the Urals. We
have calculated Pact ground force ammunition stocks
in these depots
G. Warsaw Pact Logistics Table II-15
209. Warsaw Pact exercises, classified writings, and
other evidence indicate that the Pact is planning Days of Supply for Warsaw Pact Ground Force
logistic support for a series of short campaigns of high Echelons
intensity, involving the rapid achievement of a break- Division 3-5 days
through and advance to strategic objectives in the Army ........................... 2 days
NATO rear. Warsaw Pact logistic planning factors are Front Forward .. 4 days
evidently based on Soviet World War II experience, Front Rear.10 days
and updated in accordance with changes in tactics, Total 19-21 days
force structure, and equipment. Our information in
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.