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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
Top ere
194. CBR protective equipment supplied to the
individual soldier is judged to be adequate to protect
him in a toxic environment for a matter of hours or
even days, depending on the nature and concentration
of the contaminant. The Soviets have developed field
protective shelters equipped with ventilation systems
providing air from which both toxic particulate matter
and toxic vapors have been removed. Air purification
systems (filter and positive pressure) are being in-
stalled on armored personnel carriers, tanks, and some
trucks. The Soviets have several types of decontamina-
tion trucks that can be used for decontamination of
men, terrain, and equipment, including clothing and
weapons. Agent detector kits and automatic alarms are
available in adequate quantities and are capable of
rapidly detecting all standard lethal Western and
Soviet CW agents. As with othei nations, a critical
weakness for the USSR is the problem of timely
detection of the presence of nerve agents.
195. The Pact has formed CBR defense stations at
most of its air regiments to help these forces operate in
a contaminated environment. Individual protective
equipment and several types of decontamination sta-
tions and vehicles for personnel, equipment, and
aircraft have also been deployed at most major air-
bases. Routine training is conducted in CBR defense-
training which includes alerts and exercises.
196. Some classes of Soviet naval ships have been
equipped with positive-pressure citadels and filtered
ventilation systems to permit them to operate in a
CBR environment. Soviet naval ships have wash-down
systems to enable them to remove CBR contamination.
Some classes of merchant vessels and landing ships
have also been constructed with CBR protective
systems.
F. Forces for Electronic Warfare Forces
197. In the Soviet concept, electronic warfare is a 200. Over the past decade the Soviets have initiated
fundamental part of overall planning and must be a broad series of programs to modernize and expand
integrated into all phases of combat operations. In the their already significant offensive and defensive capa-
early 1970s, a radioelectronic combat (REC) depart- bilities for REC in the European theater. Some of
ment was created within the Staff of the Combined these programs are still at an early stage of develop-
Armed Forces of the Pact to promote electronic ment, however, and will not be completed before the
warfare and to ensure standardization of equipment mid-to-late 1980s. In addition, the Pact is seeking to
and procedures among the Pact armies. improve its organization, procedures, and perform-
ance of REC units, and the abilities of Pact ground,
air, and naval forces to operate under jamming
conditions.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.