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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 25 …and subsidiary systems such as command and control, radioelectronic combat (REC), and reconnais- sance data link…
  • p. 31 …Some of these submarines might alternatively have missions of minelaying near NATO naval bases or patrolling…
  • p. 33 …The Soviet Union views control of its East Euro- preparerd for any mission, froni defending against…
  • p. 42 …The USSR attributes a littoral of Europe have significant capabilities in either broad range of missions…
  • p. 51 …Improved models of the radio-controlled The SA-9 and ZSU-23-4 are probably with…
  • p. 55 …All Pact countries have well-organized mobili- direct control of the VGK to tactical-level missions…
  • p. 58 …These have pervasive control over the soldier's activities and commanders are expected to be closely…
  • p. 59 …Frontal Aviation missions include counterair, ground attack, Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Tactical Aircraft reconnaissance, electronic warfare…
  • p. 62 …Pilot Training and Proficienc. 3Y US stand- facilities, hardening command and control facilities, and establishing pipeline…
  • p. 66 …control system which is designed to provide the coordination necessary to conduct close-in missions when…
  • p. 68 major ground formations is used by tactical controllers conventional weapons or to have an operational weap…
  • p. 71 …countries, are tailored primarily for control of guished by missions: antiship strike, reconnaissance those two seas…
  • p. 75 …missions of the Warsaw Pact's general purpose naval forces are to exercise sea control 110…
  • p. 84 …this mission. The combat radii of Soviet ASM-equipped naval Capabilities for Exercising Sea Control in…
  • p. 85 …signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the second view are the Director, Defense…
  • p. 87 …the Soviets, Poles, and East Germans other missions. Most bombers would be required for have the…
  • p. 118 …would be detached from national control. Re- - The Western TVD. This theater would include, sidual forces…
  • p. 122 …and control functions is central to Soviet control and integration of Pact military operations. Such groups…
  • p. 134 …against HEAT ammunition, the Soviets have incorpo- control and combat support communication links. rated composite or…
  • p. 135 …The Air Operation have been ascertained from classified missions assigned to the NSWP forces are intended…
  • p. 141 …Pact air forces to perform their primary missions in poor flying weather. ould be the preferred…
  • p. 143 …Others believe that no judgment with flying combat missions at low altitudes or over long any…
  • p. 158 …The establishment of control of the Norwegian drastically the likelihood of a major, preemptive at- and…
  • p. 163 …aircraft carrier probably would be unable secondary mission of antiship attack. The Kiev prob- to cope…
  • p. 175 …be building a mand and control and electronic warfare missions. force capable of siniultaneously lifting much…
  • p. 176 …The Pact's early warning network is scheduled current roles of sea control in limited areas…
  • p. 178 …We do not know how the Soviets assess the achieving sea control and in providing support…
  • p. 182 …subma- to control Pact forces once they are released from rines with peripheral missions declines, some…
  • p. 186 …Soviet sea control capabilities gravity to require an early Soviet counteraction. The against US carrier and…
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Table II-13
Selected Warsaw Pact CW Agents and Weapon Systems
Artillery Free-Fall
Munitions Bombs
(size in (weight in Rocket Missle
Agent millimeters) kilograms) Warheads Warheads
(entry indicates availability of delivery system for agent specified)
Nerve
Thickened Soman ...................... - 100 FROG Scud
Sarin ........................ . . 122, 152 100, 250 BM-21 -
BM-24
Vesicant (Blister)
M ustard ................................... 122, 152 - - -
Thickened Mustard 122, .152 - --
Thickened Lewisite .................... 122, 152 - - -
Mustard/Lewisite Mixture .......... - 100, 250, - -
500, 1,000
1,500
Thickened/Mustard/Lewisite
Mixture ........... ............. - 250, 1,000 -
Systemic
tHydrogen Cyanide ...................... - 250, 500 BM-21 -
BM-24
the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the open and
would be attacked with nonpersistent CW agents to contaminate materiel and selected areas of terrain,
delivered by tube and rocket artillery and aerial especially on the axes of defensive operations. Ground-
bombs. Some Soviet chemical bombs are fitted with a burst of thickened blister agent munitions would be
fuse designed to provide optimum area coverage. used to achieve very heavy contamination of smaller
191. Warsaw Pact military writings indicate that areas. Chemical mines are usually filled with blister
fragmentation-chemical shells, which disseminate the agents and would be used alone or interspersed with
liquid agent fill almost entirely as vapor and aerosol in antitank or antipersonnel mines.
order to cause casualties quickly through 'inhalation, CBR Training and Equipment
are to be used with unthickened GB, mustard, and
probably GD. Thickened GD is also probably filled in 193. Soviet research in chemical, biological, and
aerial airburst bombs and missile warheads to produce radiological warfare has been extensive. The Soviets
casualties from the toxic "rain" effect. Warheads for possess large quantities of a wide range of equipment,
the FROG and Scud filled with thickened GD and much of which is of recent design, for use in a toxic
fused to burst at high altitude are planned to achieve a environment. Extensive training in its use is integral to
casualty rate of up to 80 percent among unprotected military exercises for all Soviet and NSWP ground,
personnel naval, and air forces. These same training procedures
and protective equipment would enable the Soviets to
operate on the offensive as well as on the defensive
[ he casualties would1e caused primarily within the toxic areas of combat. Equipment and
by skin penetration of the toxic, thickened GD "rain." training for chemical protection are combined with
that for biological or radiological protection, and the
192. Rocket artillery would be used to blanket large special CBR troops are responsible for these three
areas with the nonpersistent agents GB and hydrogen types of activity. At present there are about 60,000
cyanide, the latter where immediate occupation of the personnel and 8,000 decontamination and 4,000 recon-
area after the attack was desired. The blister agents, naissance vehicles assigned to specialized Pact CBR
mustard and mustard-lewisite mixtures, are contained defense units. If all current, active Pact ground, air,in aerial and ground munitions fused to airburst for and naval units were brought up to full strength, the
maximum area contamination with the toxic liquid number of Pact CBR personnel would double.
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.