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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Despite these advantages the G- and H-class subma- agent production and may still be engaged in this
rines have several limitations. Both classes are about 20 activity. The nature of CW agent production is such
years old. The patrols of the diesel-powered G-class that positive identification of production facilities
submarine are limited by fuel requirements. The within an industrial chemical complex is virtually
nuclear-powered H-class submarines are relatively impossible without knowledgeable human sources.
noisy and thus more vulnerable to detection, and their 187. There is no question that the Soviets and some
nuclear power plants are not as reliable as those on East Europeans either have produced or are capable of
more modern nuclear submarines, producing toxic agents, inasmuch as their chemical
184. The SLBMs of D- and Y-class submarines plants are already handling most of the raw materials
could also be used to attack peripheral targets. required to produce these agents. We believe that the
Soviet chemical industry can easily handle production
sufficient to maintain current Soviet reserves of bulk
chemical agents, plus whatever additional quantities
are required to replace agents consumed by training
-__._and deterioration. The quantities involved are rela-
The Soviets tively small, and large-scale production of agents
almost certainly have developed contingency plans for would not be necessary.
use of the SS-N-6 on some Y-class submarines against
targets on the periphery of the USSR. The relative Stockpile
importance of the peripheral attack role for these 188. At the present time there are 10 major installa-
modern SSBNs would probably depend largely upon tions in the UsR bie to be asso ith the
thedcircumstances leading uip to a conflict and the tosin the USSR believed to be associated with the
the ircmstnceleaingup o aconfictandthe storage of CW toxic agents, filled munitions, or both.
scenario for its initiation. We cannot, therefore, pre- Atlack of evidence e le minin si or
dict the number of units that might be employed for A lack of evidence precludes determining the size or
such missions. We continue to believe, however, that composition of. the Soviet CW agent stockpile, how-
the D- and Y-class force as a whole is dedicated ever. Because we know that the Soviets have devel-
primarily to missions against US targets. oped a range of toxic agents and delivery systems, and
tactical doctrine for their use, and because we have
E. Forces for Chemical Warfare fragmentary evidence on some field depots for chemi-
cal storage, we do not doubt that they have operational
185. The Soviets have had a broad-based R&D stocks, including some in Eastern Europe. We believe
program for chemical warfare (CW) since World War these include nerve agents such as GB (sarin) and GD
II, and they remain in the forefront in CW technical (thickened and unthickened soman), as well as older
knowledge. Pact forces generally are well equipped types of agents such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard,
and trained to operate in a CBR (chemical, biological, and the mustard-lewisite mixture. Research relating to
radiological) environment. Pact ground forces have a incapacitating agents, such as the hallucinogen BZ and
variety of systems capable of delivering chemical agents closely related to it, is also continuing, but there
agents which would enable them to cover large areas is no evidence that any agents of this type are
of the combat zone from the forward edge of the stockpiled.
battle area to at least 300 kilometers beyond. Air-
dropped munitions provide the potential for large- 189. Soviet systems for the dissemination of toxic
scale strikes against NATO, especially against enemy CW agents provide a capability to attack designated
nuclear delivery targets. Naval weapon systems also targets in almost any tactical or weather situation. The
provide a theater chemical warfare capability against means of delivery include bulk-fill artillery and mor-
ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple rail- and tube-launched rockets,
sites, and amphibious landing operations. chemical mines; warheads for free rockets over ground
(FROGs), tactical ballistic missiles, and possibly cruise
Production missiles; aerial bombs and possibly spray tanks; and
186. No facilities in Warsaw Pact countries have naval chemical munitions. (See table II-13.)
been positively identified as currently producing toxic 190. The variety of Soviet chemical agents provides
CW agents in militarily significant quantities, al- a capability for attacking protected and unprotected
though several in the USSR and in some of the other troops in the open and for producing a residual
NSWP countries have historical associations with CW contamination on equipment and terrain. Targets in
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.