Documents / FOIA release
This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.
“Mission Control”29 pages
Despite these advantages the G- and H-class subma- agent production and may still be engaged in this rines have several limitations. Both classes are about 20 activity. The nature of CW agent production is such years old. The patrols of the diesel-powered G-class that positive identification of production facilities submarine are limited by fuel requirements. The within an industrial chemical complex is virtually nuclear-powered H-class submarines are relatively impossible without knowledgeable human sources. noisy and thus more vulnerable to detection, and their 187. There is no question that the Soviets and some nuclear power plants are not as reliable as those on East Europeans either have produced or are capable of more modern nuclear submarines, producing toxic agents, inasmuch as their chemical 184. The SLBMs of D- and Y-class submarines plants are already handling most of the raw materials could also be used to attack peripheral targets. required to produce these agents. We believe that the Soviet chemical industry can easily handle production sufficient to maintain current Soviet reserves of bulk chemical agents, plus whatever additional quantities are required to replace agents consumed by training -__._and deterioration. The quantities involved are rela- The Soviets tively small, and large-scale production of agents almost certainly have developed contingency plans for would not be necessary. use of the SS-N-6 on some Y-class submarines against targets on the periphery of the USSR. The relative Stockpile importance of the peripheral attack role for these 188. At the present time there are 10 major installa- modern SSBNs would probably depend largely upon tions in the UsR bie to be asso ith the thedcircumstances leading uip to a conflict and the tosin the USSR believed to be associated with the the ircmstnceleaingup o aconfictandthe storage of CW toxic agents, filled munitions, or both. scenario for its initiation. We cannot, therefore, pre- Atlack of evidence e le minin si or dict the number of units that might be employed for A lack of evidence precludes determining the size or such missions. We continue to believe, however, that composition of. the Soviet CW agent stockpile, how- the D- and Y-class force as a whole is dedicated ever. Because we know that the Soviets have devel- primarily to missions against US targets. oped a range of toxic agents and delivery systems, and tactical doctrine for their use, and because we have E. Forces for Chemical Warfare fragmentary evidence on some field depots for chemi- cal storage, we do not doubt that they have operational 185. The Soviets have had a broad-based R&D stocks, including some in Eastern Europe. We believe program for chemical warfare (CW) since World War these include nerve agents such as GB (sarin) and GD II, and they remain in the forefront in CW technical (thickened and unthickened soman), as well as older knowledge. Pact forces generally are well equipped types of agents such as hydrogen cyanide, mustard, and trained to operate in a CBR (chemical, biological, and the mustard-lewisite mixture. Research relating to radiological) environment. Pact ground forces have a incapacitating agents, such as the hallucinogen BZ and variety of systems capable of delivering chemical agents closely related to it, is also continuing, but there agents which would enable them to cover large areas is no evidence that any agents of this type are of the combat zone from the forward edge of the stockpiled. battle area to at least 300 kilometers beyond. Air- dropped munitions provide the potential for large- 189. Soviet systems for the dissemination of toxic scale strikes against NATO, especially against enemy CW agents provide a capability to attack designated nuclear delivery targets. Naval weapon systems also targets in almost any tactical or weather situation. The provide a theater chemical warfare capability against means of delivery include bulk-fill artillery and mor- ships at sea, points of embarkation, forward storage tar shells; multiple rail- and tube-launched rockets, sites, and amphibious landing operations. chemical mines; warheads for free rockets over ground (FROGs), tactical ballistic missiles, and possibly cruise Production missiles; aerial bombs and possibly spray tanks; and 186. No facilities in Warsaw Pact countries have naval chemical munitions. (See table II-13.) been positively identified as currently producing toxic 190. The variety of Soviet chemical agents provides CW agents in militarily significant quantities, al- a capability for attacking protected and unprotected though several in the USSR and in some of the other troops in the open and for producing a residual NSWP countries have historical associations with CW contamination on equipment and terrain. Targets in 11-59
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.