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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 11 …Forces in the Moscow, volga, Ural, and Turkestan Military Districts could be used against NATO or…
  • p. 27 …initiate such use, although the possibility cannot be entirely excluded. DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air…
  • p. 28 …DIA and Navy estimate that six to 10 reserve submarines could be brought to operational status…
  • p. 29 …CIA, State, NSA, and Navy estimate that the performance characteristics, deployment patterns, training programs, and exercise…
  • p. 30 …DIA, NSA, Army, Navy, and Air Force hold that the Soviets might choose to attack with…
  • p. 31 …Likelihood of Soviet Use of Nuclear Weapons at Sea Before Their Use on Land. Navy judges…
  • p. 56 Aviation (VTA) were used simultaneously, only one increasing amount of complex equiprnent entering the fully equipped…
  • p. 70 …but Aeroflot's 160 AN-12s could be used to lift heavy During peacetime, these Cubs…
  • p. 79 designed primarily for use against large-area targets, and speeds and maximum ranges of from 80…
  • p. 82 …The Pact navies must seek out Bear D aircraft. The Kiev can also receive targeting Western…
  • p. 84 …The Pact countries can concentrate ASW forces and use Pact navies maintain the bulk of their…
  • p. 85 …NATO placed on resources by the Soviet Navy's other mis- decision not to deploy carrier…
  • p. 87 …Thus the Pact would German Navies are capable of transporting less than probably commit few bombers…
  • p. 88 …As of 1975, however, weapons are also carried by many of the Soviet Navy's only…
  • p. 90 …that the expanded use of Frontal Aviation is regarded as only a partial solution to the…
  • p. 92 …submarines would be likely to be used to strike targets in NATO Europe, and the 150…
  • p. 96 …long-range bomber with the capability to strike US From Liepaja, G-II class submarines fitted…
  • p. 100 …the Directorof Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy. The longer range and radius values in the…
  • p. 113 …Aboard ship the Soviets currently use a scheduled inspection 249. The Soviet Navy has the capability…
  • p. 114 …In addition, the Navy has the option of using merchant communications circuits for command and control…
  • p. 115 …In addition, the Soviet Navy could station an there, railroads and poor-quality highways extend to…
  • p. 122 …Some common computer programs are being used for logistics and battle management sup- 13. In wartime…
  • p. 145 Top Table IV-4 Warsaw Pact General Purpose Naval Forces Estimated To Be Available for Use…
  • p. 146 …German some extent by a shuttle using conventional landing Navies, plus mobilized merchant ships. Assault forces…
  • p. 147 …If the amphibious assaults sary to use far larger forces to escort convoys than were canceled…
  • p. 148 …Eastern Europe and the USSR by the US 6th sweeping NATO's mines or of successfully…
  • p. 152 …follow with strikes using air-to-surface missiles (ASMs),- The Bulgarian and Romanian Navies. Does not…
  • p. 154 …Many have air defense missiles which can be used in an antiship 143. Some believe " that…
  • p. 156 …Soviet Northern Fleet would be used to available LRA and Navy bombers. But we do not…
  • p. 158 …forces were optimized for maximum D-day impact, however, the Soviet Navy would give NATO early…
  • p. 159 …They probably Missile Cruisers 6 would attempt to use these submarines to intercept Cruisers ... 1 Missile…
  • p. 164 …mansk area can be covered by the long-range cruise missiles of the Soviet Navy's…
  • p. 165 …and conventionally armed area air defense against US and UK attacking aircraft missiles, thereby reducing the…
  • p. 168 …the Soviets would use aircraft mainly in battlefield strikes in close proximity to Pact forces, presumably…
  • p. 176 …This aircraft, which is optimized for short-haul Soviet Navy will produce a force with improved…
  • p. 177 …titanium hulls are used, the operational depth limit could reach about 600 meters. According to one…
  • p. 179 …Soviet Navy inventory of Polnoeny-class medium landing ships may also be planning to use the…
  • p. 180 …The Soviet Navy needs a long-range SAM mid-1980s. for defense beyond 20 nm, as…
  • p. 186 …Nonetheless, the would view the presence of US carriers operating in Soviets clearly regard the US…
  • p. 187 …The Soviet Navy maintains a small force in the to Middle Eastern oil were to become…
  • p. 188 …Cuban military contribution in support of Navy also uses port facilities in Benin and Angola but…
  • p. 200 …T s copy is for the iormation and use of the recipient and of persons under…
Differing Agency Assessments of the Backfire Figure 11-30b
Estimated Characteristics b DIA/Army/Air Force CIA
Weights-kg (lb m)
Structural Weight 33,500 (73,800) 33,700 (74,270)
Operational Empty Weight 52,400 (115,500) 50,800 (112,000)
Fuel Weight, Bombing Mission 68,000 (150,000) 51,700 (114,000)
Payload Weight, Bombing Mission 9,400 (20,800) 4,500 (10,000)
Takeoff Gross Weight 130,900 (288,500) 107,000 (236,000)
Propulsion
Installed Intermediate Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea-Level Thrust-
kN (Ib r) 210 (47,000) 145 (32,500)
Cruise Specific Fuel Consumption (lb m/lb rhr) 0.93 1.04
CIA Optimized CIA Compromised
Aerodynamic Design c Aerodynamic Design
Aerodynamics
Cruise Lift-to-Drag Ratio 16.6 16.3 13.9
Cruise Speed-Mach 0.79 0.80 0.80
Mission Performance Unrefueled-nn
All-High, Bomber, Radius/Range 2,900/5,400 2,150/4,150 1,825/3,525
All-High, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range 2,600/4,500 1,650/2,900 1,400/2,425
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, Bomber, Radius/Ranger 2,450/4,950 1,750/3,750 1,450/3,125
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range r 2,200/4,000 1,275/2,525 1,050/2,100
200 nm Supersonic Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range s 1,750/3,950 950/3,050 825/2,600
Mission Performance Refueled-nm a
All-High, Bomber, Radius/Range 4,000/7,500 e 3,200/6,225 2,825/5,475
All-High, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range 3,750/6,450 2,800/4,950 2,500/4,350
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range r 3,650/7,050 2,875/5,775 2,525/5,080
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range f 3,400/6,000 2,500/4,550 2,200/4,000
200 nm Supersonic Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range s 2,900/6,050 2,025/5,100 1,825/4,550
-This table gives assessments of performance for the Backfire as it is currently configured.
b According to one view, it is not possible with the evidence at hand to derive with confidence a single-figure capabilityfor the maximum
radius/range of the Backfire. The holders of this view are the Director,National Security Agency, and the Directorof Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
The longer range and radius values in the assessment of the Backfire by the Central Intelligence Agency are based on an assumed
aerodynamic design which is optimized for subsonic performance, while the shorter range and radius values are based on an assumed
compromised design. CIA has considered both designs because they represent reasonable upper and lower bounds of the Backfire's subsonic
cruise efficiency.
dThe uncertainties in these estimates of the Backfire's performance are as follows: CIA range ±300 nm, radius ±160nm; DIA/Army/Air
Force range +162 nm, -486 nm, radius +87 nm, -261 nm.
The radius/rangevalues of the DIA/Army/Air Force assessment, with a 4,500-kg (10,000-lb) payload, comparable to that used by the
CIA assessment, are 2,950/5,750 nrn unrefueled.
rThese radius/range values are for a high-altitude, optimum-cruise profile except for a 200-mn subsonic dash at sea level into the target
area. The radius value also includes a 200-nm subsonic dash for egress (400 rn total).
s The radius value includes 200 nm for ingress and 200 nm for egress at supersonic speed (400 nm total); the range value includes 200 run for
ingress only.
579031 an cu
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is under it. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.