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Warsaw Pact Forces opposite NATO, NIE 11-14-79, Volume II, the Estimate, CIA/NFAC, 31 January 1979

Central Intelligence Agency · 201 pages · text from the file's own layer

This is Volume II of National Intelligence Estimate 11-14-79, Warsaw Pact Forces Opposite NATO, issued by the Director of Central Intelligence and dated January 1979. The National Foreign Intelligence Board concurred with it. It was the first comprehensive estimate of Pact forces facing NATO since 1971. It covers Pact doctrine, the ground, air, naval, nuclear and chemical forces, command and control, and campaign plans for war in Europe. It judges that Central Europe would be the decisive arena, and it lists Pact weaknesses in pilot training and antisubmarine warfare. The document contains no UFO material.

  • p. 24 in NIE 11-4-78, Soviet Goals and Expectations in the Global Power Arena. We proceed…
  • p. 25 …We foresee no development over the next several years which would appreciably alter the basic Pact…
  • p. 26 …advances and ensure that combat potentials are fully realized. We expect a modest decline in the…
  • p. 28 …where the outcome is in serious doubt, the attractiveness of SLOC interdiction in advance of a…
  • p. 37 …qualitative and numerical advances in their forward- 12. Despite the Soviets' having adopted a policy for…
  • p. 40 …permit the high rates of appreciation of the risks and rewards of introducing advance which they…
  • p. 46 …The holders sion system, a more advanced and more powerful of this view are the Director…
  • p. 57 …The Soviets are attempting to provide quick difficulties in recruiting personnel for these programs. advancement and…
  • p. 63 combat capability of these units continues to be and 40 percent of the force is equipped…
  • p. 68 …reconnaissance erated by new, advanced air munitions are justified to units. The Soviets believe that a…
  • p. 69 …The Soviets have made some advances in irnproved infrared seeker, improved motors, and possi- streamlining their…
  • p. 85 …advance of a conflict goes up. signed missions; submarines would not neces-" The holders of the…
  • p. 103 …the immediate path of a Soviet advance probably They would be used against personnel in the…
  • p. 106 …judge the soundness of these Pact planning but representative models of this more advanced factors in…
  • p. 108 …the ability to sustain the momentum of an advance is determined not only by the availability…
  • p. 112 Top e ammunition, bombs, and rockets and some 23,700 tons duration, but could affect the…
  • p. 114 …emergency without the necessity of advanced notices and prior coordination. Thus, before the begin- ning of…
  • p. 119 …The Pact has made advance preparations to activated, their signal support units establish the con- man…
  • p. 126 …advance, Pact planners hope to overrun, penetrate, or bypass NATO 9. Pact planning for the Western…
  • p. 132 …Circumstances permitting, the Pact would build of advance. Depending on the importance of the axis up…
  • p. 133 …then disperse, continuing the barrage, the assaulting infantry and tank units, using advance or exploitation along…
  • p. 134 …Respites from combat would be used to Germany, and advance toward crossings over the restore the…
  • p. 147 …surface ships into the important for maintaining a high rate of advance North Sea prior to…
  • p. 149 …would use force to advance through Yugoslavia to 119. Against the Dardanelles and the Bosporus. attack…
  • p. 150 …overcome Turkish dlefenses and secure the and to advance to the Aegean Sea and from there…
  • p. 151 …In Initial Naval Operations in the Black Sea these exercises six Soviet divisions notionally advance 126…
  • p. 153 …Backfire strike aircraft can cover virtually the several hours in advance of the attack. Soviet ships…
  • p. 157 doubtful ability of ground forces advancing across land-based NATO air defense forces in northern and…
  • p. 172 …The changes will improve radiation weapons and advanced cruise missiles-may the combined-arms capabilities of…
  • p. 173 …The number of SP guns in the East German, Soviets are likely to continue the advances…
  • p. 174 …technology is believed to be more advanced speeds than the other Pact fighter-bombers. for these…
  • p. 175 …Soviet Military Trans- survivability of the helicopter in an advanced air port Aviation (VTA) will continue…
  • p. 176 …ships, submarines, and aircraft replace less capable units and the technology of cruise missiles is advanced…
  • p. 179 …the new LPDs and about six Ropuchas by the mid- Given the effort placed on advanced…
  • p. 180 …for defense beyond 20 nm, as well as more advanced 82. Tactical ASW Missiles. The SS…
  • p. 183 …support the developing centralized command struc- and the acquisition of some advanced electronic ture. The VAKSS…
  • p. 185 …The Soviets probably would consider that advances into Soviet territory during the early stages the risks…
Differing Agency Assessments of the Backfire Figure 11-30b
Estimated Characteristics b DIA/Army/Air Force CIA
Weights-kg (lb m)
Structural Weight 33,500 (73,800) 33,700 (74,270)
Operational Empty Weight 52,400 (115,500) 50,800 (112,000)
Fuel Weight, Bombing Mission 68,000 (150,000) 51,700 (114,000)
Payload Weight, Bombing Mission 9,400 (20,800) 4,500 (10,000)
Takeoff Gross Weight 130,900 (288,500) 107,000 (236,000)
Propulsion
Installed Intermediate Sea-Level Thrust-kN (lb r) 120 (27,000) 105 (23,500)
Installed Maximum Afterburner Sea-Level Thrust-
kN (Ib r) 210 (47,000) 145 (32,500)
Cruise Specific Fuel Consumption (lb m/lb rhr) 0.93 1.04
CIA Optimized CIA Compromised
Aerodynamic Design c Aerodynamic Design
Aerodynamics
Cruise Lift-to-Drag Ratio 16.6 16.3 13.9
Cruise Speed-Mach 0.79 0.80 0.80
Mission Performance Unrefueled-nn
All-High, Bomber, Radius/Range 2,900/5,400 2,150/4,150 1,825/3,525
All-High, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range 2,600/4,500 1,650/2,900 1,400/2,425
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, Bomber, Radius/Ranger 2,450/4,950 1,750/3,750 1,450/3,125
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range r 2,200/4,000 1,275/2,525 1,050/2,100
200 nm Supersonic Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range s 1,750/3,950 950/3,050 825/2,600
Mission Performance Refueled-nm a
All-High, Bomber, Radius/Range 4,000/7,500 e 3,200/6,225 2,825/5,475
All-High, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range 3,750/6,450 2,800/4,950 2,500/4,350
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range r 3,650/7,050 2,875/5,775 2,525/5,080
200 nm Sea-Level Dash, 2 ASMs, Radius/Range f 3,400/6,000 2,500/4,550 2,200/4,000
200 nm Supersonic Dash, Bomber, Radius/Range s 2,900/6,050 2,025/5,100 1,825/4,550
-This table gives assessments of performance for the Backfire as it is currently configured.
b According to one view, it is not possible with the evidence at hand to derive with confidence a single-figure capabilityfor the maximum
radius/range of the Backfire. The holders of this view are the Director,National Security Agency, and the Directorof Naval Intelligence,
Department of the Navy.
The longer range and radius values in the assessment of the Backfire by the Central Intelligence Agency are based on an assumed
aerodynamic design which is optimized for subsonic performance, while the shorter range and radius values are based on an assumed
compromised design. CIA has considered both designs because they represent reasonable upper and lower bounds of the Backfire's subsonic
cruise efficiency.
dThe uncertainties in these estimates of the Backfire's performance are as follows: CIA range ±300 nm, radius ±160nm; DIA/Army/Air
Force range +162 nm, -486 nm, radius +87 nm, -261 nm.
The radius/rangevalues of the DIA/Army/Air Force assessment, with a 4,500-kg (10,000-lb) payload, comparable to that used by the
CIA assessment, are 2,950/5,750 nrn unrefueled.
rThese radius/range values are for a high-altitude, optimum-cruise profile except for a 200-mn subsonic dash at sea level into the target
area. The radius value also includes a 200-nm subsonic dash for egress (400 rn total).
s The radius value includes 200 nm for ingress and 200 nm for egress at supersonic speed (400 nm total); the range value includes 200 run for
ingress only.
579031 an cu
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FOIA release, from the cia-readingroom collection. The PDF is mirrored here; the original link is above. 201 pages are in the text index: search them above, or from the library's search.